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NOTES
Left To One’s Devices: Congress Limits
Patents on Medical Procedures
Brett G. Alten*
INTRODUCTION
Nearly three centuries ago in England, generations of doctors
from the Chamberlen family saved women from death and injury
with the predecessor of obstetric forceps.1 To keep their forceps
secret from other physicians, the Chamberlen doctors blindfolded
the women during labor, sealed the delivery room from prying
eyes, and rang bells and blew whistles during the procedure.2 The
Chamberlen doctors gained competitive advantage and profited
from their remarkable invention because they kept it secret.3
Some believe, however, that the Chamberlen doctors would
have patented their invention and the accompanying medical procedure had they been given the opportunity to do so.4 Then, they
could have publicized the forceps and the medical procedures

* Fordham University School of Law, J.D. 1998. The author is thankful for guidance from Professor Joseph Garon of Fordham University School of Law, as well as
Elaine Drager, Douglas Cardwell, Jennifer Weissman, Gene Lee, and Russell Faegenberg. This Note is dedicated to my wife Tomoko for giving me time and support.
1. See, e.g., M. Thiery, De uitvinders van de verlostang en de obstetrische hefboom
[The inventors of the obstetric forceps and the obstetric lever], 54(1) VERH K ACAD
GENEESKD BELG 45-53 (1992); R.M. Matthews, Historical note (obstetrical forceps and
Dr. Peter Chamberlen), 35(270) J.R. C. GEN. PRAC. 44 (1985); M. Dumont, Histoire et
petite histoire du forceps. [History and sidelights on the forceps], 13(7) J. GYNECOL.
OBSTET. BIOL. REPROD. 743 (1984); Jeffrey I.D. Lewis, Congressional Legislation Would
Restrict Medical Patents, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8, 1996, at S1.
2. See Lewis, supra note 1, at S1 (noting that this may possibly be the origin of the
term “bells and whistles”).
3. See id.
4. See id.
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while still receiving financial gains.5 Such disclosure of the procedures could have permitted further development and improvement.6
Until recently, patents on medical procedures were rarely
granted and even more rarely enforced in the United States.7 But
by 1996 it was estimated that as many as fifteen medical procedures were patented every week.8 As a result, leaders of the medical profession scrambled to stamp out that trend, based on the belief that medical procedure patents threaten innovation.9
On September 30, 1996, Congress included a limitation on
medical procedure patent infringement in the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997.10 The provision, section
287(c),11 created a safe haven from patent infringement liability
under certain circumstances. Proponents of section 287(c) argue
that it addresses problems with medical procedure patents and the
infringement lawsuits that naturally flow from the ownership and
enforcement of those patents.12

5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Thiery, supra note 1 (noting Rogier Roonhuyse’s “more effective” instrument for dealing with the problem of an impacted head).
7. See Brian McCormick, Just Reward or Just Plain Wrong? Specter of Royalties
From Method Patents Stirs Debate, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 5, 1994, at 3.
8. See Wendy W. Yang, Patent Policy and Medical Procedure Patents: The Case
for Statutory Exclusion From Patentability, 1 B.U. J. SCI, & TECH. L. 5 (1995); Carolyn
Lederman, M.D., Pallin patent is invalidated; Ophthalmic surgeon Samuel Pallin abandons patent for sutureless cataract procedure, OPHTHALMOLOGY TIMES, June 1, 1996, at
34 (noting a paper prepared by the American Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery,
which estimated that medical procedure patents are issued by the United States Patent
and Trademark Office at the rate of 750 per year); Rep. Greg Ganske, Medical Procedure
Patents Put Patients at Risk, Legal Restrictions on Life-Saving Techniques Increase
Health Care Costs and Threaten Consumers, ROLL CALL, Sept. 16, 1996 (reporting that
as many as one hundred pure medical patents are issued each month).
9. See Sabra Chartrand, Why is This Surgeon Suing?, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at
Dl.
10. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Limitation On Patent Infringements
Relating To A Medical Practitioner’s Performance Of A Medical Activity, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, § 616 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (Supp.
1996)).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
12. See President Signs Medical Patent Bill; Physicians Freed from Threat of New
Medical Procedure Patent Lawsuits, P.R. Newswire, Oct. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Medical Patent Bill].
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The recent enforcement of a medical procedure patent against a
physician alerted the public to the possible ramifications of such a
patent13 and probably was the driving force behind the passage of
section 287(c). The medical procedure patent at issue was granted
to Dr. Samuel L. Pallin for a surgical procedure: stitchless cataract
surgery.14 Dr. Pallin’s patented procedure reduces the probability
of astigmatism, lowers the chance of infection, and shortens recovery time.15 In exchange for disclosing the procedure in his patent
to the medical profession, Dr. Pallin planned to charge ophthalmologists a royalty to use it.16
In 1994, Dr. Pallin initiated what may be the first United States
patent infringement suit involving a medical procedure patent and
physician defendant.17 Opponents of medical procedure patents
argued that because as many as half of all cataract procedures performed in the United States might employ Dr. Pallin’s procedure,
his patent represented a significant cost increase to patients and the
health care system in general.18 Dr. Pallin maintained, however,
that the technique actually saves patients money, even with an estimated five-dollar royalty, because the procedure eliminates the
need for a seventeen-dollar suture, resulting in a twelve-dollar saving.19 In addition to saving patients money, Dr. Pallin contended
that the procedure would not even be known or available to the
medical profession had he not patented and disclosed it.20 In
13. See Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050 (D. Vt. 1995) (denying the motion for
summary judgment by the alleged infringers of a patented surgical technique); see also
Charles Craig, Biotech Backers Fear Medical Patent Ban Will Hurt Industry,
BIOWORLD TODAY, July 26, 1996.
14. Cataract Surgical Procedure, United States Patent No. 5,080,111 (issued Jan. 14,
1992) [hereinafter Cataract Surgical Patent].
15. See id.
16. See McCormick, supra note 7, at 4.
17. See Pallin, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1050.
18. See Chet Scerra, Medical Patent Bill Gives Doctors New Protections,
OPHTHALMOLOGY TIMES, Jan. 15, 1997, at 28.
19. See Should Surgical Procedures be Patentable?, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1995, at
Z12 (reporting that the total cost of such a surgery is usually about $1,000, making the
$5.00 fee equivalent to a 0.5% royalty).
20. See Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act: Hearings on H.R.
1127 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 134 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1127] (testimony of
Dr. Samuel Lear Pallin).
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March 1996, however, the United States District Court for the District of Vermont terminated Dr. Pallin’s suit by issuing a consent
order that invalidated the claims at issue and enjoined Dr. Pallin
from enforcing his patent.21
But the controversy surrounding the patentability of medical
procedures did not end with the issuance of the Pallin consent order.22 On the contrary, legislation pending in the United States
Congress23 was amended24 and section 287 (c) became law.25
Section 287(c) precludes a plaintiff from filing a civil action
for either monetary damages or injunctive relief against a medical
practitioner or against a related health care entity for performing a
“medical activity” that would otherwise constitute an infringement
or inducement to infringe under United States patent law.26 Therefore, when a medical procedure is found to be a “medical activity,”
that procedure, although patentable, is not enforceable.27
Section 287(c) did not become law quietly; vigorous debate
surrounded its predecessor bil1s.28 At the heart of the controversy
was the question of whether a long tradition of sharing medical
knowledge and techniques should give way to contemporary notions of intellectual property rights.29 Some contended that doctors
had an ethical obligation to disseminate innovations without
charge.30 Others believed that doctors had the same rights as engi-

21. See Pallin v. Singer, No. 2:93-CV-202, 1996 WL 274407, at *1 (D. Vt. Mar. 28,
1996) (issuing a consent order declaring all of Dr. Pallin’s patent claims in the case invalid).
22. See Eye Surgeon Loses Effort To Enforce His Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996,
at D20; John D. Murnane & Lisa B. Kole, Congress Debates M.D. Monopoly on Technique, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 12, 1996, at C19; Chartrand, supra note 9, at Dl.
23. See S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995).
24. See S. 2105, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996).
25. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), available in WESTLAW, 1996
H.R. 3610, at *149-52.
26. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-863 (1995).
27. The scope and meaning of the term “medical activity” is very difficult to determine. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
28. See supra notes 23 and 24 (citing the predecessor bills).
29. See Steve Wilson, Patents take Medicine Another Step in Wrong Direction,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 9, 1995, at A2.
30. See Edward Felsenthal, Medical patents Trigger Debate Among Doctors, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 11, 1994, at B1.
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neers or chemists, who traditionally obtain patents and royalties for
new techniques.31
This Note argues that Congress erred by passing section 287(c)
because it prevents inventors of medical procedures from obtaining
patent protection. Part I briefly discusses and reviews medical
procedure patent law in the United States. Part II examines the
legislative history of section 287(c) and explores various policy issues surrounding the patenting of medical procedures. Part III
highlights problems associated with section 287(c), applies the legislation to two medical procedure patents, and demonstrates the
ways in which the law is vague, substantively deficient, and an invitation to litigation. This Note concludes that section 287(c)
should be repealed or at least significantly modified to avoid injustice.
I. MEDICAL PROCEDURE PATENT LAW
A patent forms a social contract between an inventor and society. The inventor provides a disclosure to society “that teaches
one of ordinary skill in the art how best to make and use” a novel,
useful, and non-obvious invention.33 In exchange, society denies
others, for a limited time, the right to make, use, sell, or import the
invention.34 This part discusses that mutual exchange, including
the requirements for obtaining a patent in the United States and the
rights of patent owners—especially medical patent owners.
32

A. Statutory Requirements to Obtain a United States Patent
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to make
laws which “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive

31. See Wilson, supra note 29, at A2.
32. Skewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489 (1974) (stating that a patent is a public bargain, granting exclusive use in return for disclosure). See generally
Brian P. O’Shaughnessy, The False Inventive Genus: Developing a New Approach for
Analyzing the Sufficiency of Patent Disclosure Within the Unpredictable Arts, 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 147, 149 (1996) (“The patent grant is a social
contract.”).
33. Id.
34. See id.
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Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”35 This clause
probably derives from fourteenth century English patent law36 and
reflects the Constitution’s underlying instrumentalist policy.37 For
example, Justice Story asserted in a very early case, that the main
object of the constitutional grant is to promote science and the useful arts; reward to individual inventors is merely a means to an
end.38
Although the Constitution empowers Congress to establish a
patent system, the Constitution does not itself establish one.39
Therefore, the Constitution does not provide inventors with any
patent rights directly, and it sets no standards for the patentability
of individual inventions.40
The first United States patent statute was passed in 1790
(“1790 Act”),41 during the early days of the first Congress.42
Originally, the 1790 Act granted patents under a procedure involving three high-level government officials, an arduous system,
which Congress replaced in 1793 with pro forma registration.43 In
1836, a formal system using professional examiners replaced the
pro forma registration system.44 Since that time, the patent system
has developed substantially,45 undergoing its first major revision in

35. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cls. 8, 18. According to the United States Constitution:
[8] [The Congress shall have Power] To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Art, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
....
[18] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.
Id.
36. See Gregory F. Burch, Note, Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of Medical
Processes, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1139, 1144, n.28 (1987).
37. See id. at 1144.
38. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.), 19 (1829).
39. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 36 (1992).
40. See id.
41. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790).
42. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 7.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 7-8 (noting that the “more than novel” requirement was added in the

ALTEN.TYP

1998]

9/29/2006 4:41 PM

ONE’S OWN DEVICES: MEDICAL PROCEDURE PATENTS

843

1952, which clearly defined the requirements an inventor must
meet in order to obtain a patent.46 Three of those requirements are
set forth in section 101 of title 35 of the United States Code (“section 101”).47
Section 101 states that a patent may be granted to “who[m]ever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . .”48 In other words, section 101 requires that an
invention must be novel, useful, and fall within one of four statutory classes of subject matter—processes, machines, manufactures,
and compositions of matter.49 The usefulness and statutory subject
matter requirements are explicit in section 101, but the novelty requirement, alluded to by the word “new” in section 101, is treated
more fully under section 102 of title 35 of the United States Code
(“section 102”).50 In addition, section 103 of that title (“section
103”) further addresses novelty by precluding the grant of patents
where the differences disclosed are obvious in light of the prior art.
Finally, to earn the grant of a patent, an inventor must provide,
among other things, a disclosure of the invention that is sufficient
to warrant the rights the inventor will receive. The specific requirements are set forth in section 112 (“section 112”).
1. Novelty
A requisite to obtain a patent for an invention is that a person
must disclose and teach something new.51 An invention is not new
when all the elements of the invention are present in a single piece
of relevant “prior art.”52 Section 102 sets out in detail what is
mid-nineteenth century to limit the number of patents issued at that time).
46. See id. at 9.
47. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). According to section 101: “Who[m]ever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.” Id.
48. Id.
49. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 9.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1975).
51. See, e.g., HERBERT SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW & PRACTICE 49-73 (2d ed. 1995)
(providing a summary of the prerequisites to patentability).
52. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir.
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available as prior art.53
In order to show a claimed invention lacks novelty, a single
prior art device or practice must anticipate the claimed invention—
each and every element of the claimed invention must be disclosed
in the single device or practice.54 That is, there must be no difference between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure,
as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention.55 Thus, a party challenging novelty must demonstrate, among
other things, identity of invention.56 Essentially, section 102 ensures that only new products and processes are patentable.57
Under section 102(b), an invention may not be publicly used
more than one year prior to the date of the application for a patent;
otherwise, the invention will be barred.58 That means that an invention may be publicly used and discussed up to one year before
an application for a patent is filed in the Patent Office, without losing any United States patent rights.59 Moreover, under the “experimental use” doctrine, an inventor may refine the invention or
assess its value relative to the time and expense of prosecuting a
patent application, even if that experimental use is more than one
year before the filing date of the patent application.60 Thus, it is
well established that experimental use is not public use.61

1985), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 976 (1985).
53. Thorough analysis of every subsection of section 102, however, is beyond the
scope of this Note.
54. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 3.2, at 57 (3d ed.
1994).
55. See id. at 58.
56. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg., Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc.,
976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
57. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 51.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1975).
59. Public disclosure of the invention, however, before the filing date of an application for patent would likely be sufficient to defeat patentability in most countries.
60. In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
61. See Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg., Co., 815 F.2d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Melody L. Harness, What is “Experimental” Medical Treatment?: A Legislative Definition is Needed,
44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67 (1996). But see HARMON, supra note 54, at 82-86 (stating that a
potential problem with the “experimental use” approach occurs with respect to “showing
an experimental purpose”).
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2. Utility
In order to obtain a patent, a person must teach something useful.
Interestingly, although utility is a relatively rare issue of
contention during the prosecution and enforcement of patents,63
courts have used issues of functional utility to deny medical patents. Today, the utility requirement is met provided that the invention works in a way to solve the problem it was designed to solve64
and the invention provides some minimum social benefit or utility.65 The social benefit or utility aspect is most relevant to medical procedure patents.
62

The issue of whether a particular invention had social utility
was at issue in several early court decisions. For example, in one
case, Justice Story noted that a socially useful invention is one that
is beneficial and not injurious to the morals, health, or good order
of society.66 In another case, Justice Story explained that utility
would be lacking if an invention were “frivolous or injurious to the
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.”67 In other
words, the invention “must achieve a human purpose that is not illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy.”68
Historically, the courts have disallowed patents on inventions
on such public policy grounds in a number of cases.69 For example, during the nineteenth century, the doctrine of social utility was
often invoked to deny patents on gambling devices and products or
processes useful only for perpetrating fraud.70 That is, a patent
was withheld only if the invention could not have been used for

62. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 51.
63. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 147.
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., id. (cautioning that the invention may not be completely harmful or
deleterious).
66. See Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (“By useful invention, in
the statute, is meant such a one as may be applied to seem beneficial use in society, in
contradistinction to an invention, which is injurious to the morals, the health, or the good
order of society.”).
67. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (No. 8568) (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
68. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY,
VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 4.01 (1996).
69. See id. § 4.03.
70. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 156.
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any honest and moral purpose. But, as some commentators have
argued, the courts should not apply subjective ideas of honesty and
morality because those ideas change with time.71 Therefore, when
properly viewed, the public policy doctrine should be a narrow
one.72 Nonetheless, throughout this early period, courts invoked
the doctrine of social utility to deny certain types of patents.73
In 1941, the courts began turning away from the doctrine of social utility to deny patents, especially when based on indeterminate
moral standards.74 In 1966, the Supreme Court, under the direction
of Chief Justice Warren, lowered the utility threshold further and
required the government to refuse the grant of a patent unless an
inventor proved any existing, practical use.75 Later, the Supreme
Court refined this rule and held that an invention must have a specific social benefit, i.e., “practical utility,” in a currently available
form to justify patentability.76 More recently, the Eighth Circuit
71. See id. at 157. Another commentator has noted that:
Courts have in some instances talked of “morals, health, and good order of society” in determining utility. Anyone whose life has spanned a decade or two
in the 20th Century has witnessed how moral standards can change in a period
of a few years. Gambling devices, frowned upon early in the century, are legalized in several states; race tracks and lotteries are now used to generate substantial amounts of income in many states. Birth control devices, in a period of
thirty to forty years, have come from a position of illegality to a position where
they are welcomed by some as a means of curbing a population explosion.
Thus, in determining “utility” based on public morals, the courts should apply a
test which will not penalize an inventor who may be prescient enough to be anticipating basic needs of a society changed by forces yet unrecognized by the
general public.
R. CHOATE, PATENT LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 380 (1973), quoted in CHISUM, supra
note 68, § 4.03.
72. See CHISUM, supra note 68, § 4.03.
73. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 39, at 156 (recounting the denial of patents on
inventions related to gambling); see also, e.g., Schultz v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (N.D. Cal.
1897) (denying a patent on coin return device for coin-operated machines because the
invention had potential applications to slot machines); National Automatic Device Corp.
v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 90 (N.D. Ill. 1889) (denying a patent on a toy horse race course because the course was used in bars for betting purposes).
74. See Chicago Patent v. Genco, 124 F.2d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 1941) (distinguishing
pinball from gambling to uphold a patent on a pinball machine); see also MERGES, supra
note 39, at 156.
75. See JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES §
3.02[3], at 3-6 (1996).
76. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529-36 (1966) (holding that
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Court of Appeals lowered the utility threshold even further by
holding that even a slight degree of utility is sufficient; in short,
“the defense of non-utility cannot be sustained without proof of total incapacity.”77
3. Patentable Process Subject Matter
In addition to being useful, the subject matter of the invention
must fall within a statutory class of subject matter.78 In order to be
patentable, the invention must be either a process, machine,79
manufacture,80 or composition of matter.81 Under section 100(b),
the term “process” means process, art or method, and includes a
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material.82

“[u]nless and until a process is refined and developed to this point—where specific benefit exists in currently available form, there is insufficient justification for permitting and
applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field”); see also, e.g., SCHLICHER, supra note 75, at 4 (summarizing three factors set forth in Brenner for determining practical
utility: (1) the concern about cartels, (2) the quid pro quo ideas about the dissemination
of invention, and (3) the quid pro quo ideas about use after expiration).
77. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Berkeley, 620 F.2d 1247, 1260 n.17 (8th Cir.
1980).
78. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 49.
79. See, e.g., Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Halliburton, 306 U.S. 550 (1939) (equating the
term “machine” with the term “apparatus”); Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S.
366 (1909) (detailing that historically the Supreme Court required a machine to be “a
thing visible to the eye” and “an object of perpetual observation”); Corning v. Burden, 56
U.S. 252 (1854) (explaining that the term “machine” includes “every mechanical device
or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce
a certain effect or result”).
80. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (finding that the term
“manufacture” means “articles prepared for use from raw materials by giving to these
materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combination, whether by hand labor or by
machinery”); Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699 (3d Cir.) (holding that the term
“manufacture” is “anything manmade that is not a machine or a composition of matter”),
cert. denied, 229 U.S. 617 (1913).
81. See, e.g., Diamond, 447 U.S. 303 (explaining that the term “composition of matter” means all compositions of two or more substances and all composite articles,
whether the result of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether gases, fluids,
powders, or solids).
82. See id.
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4. Non-obviousness
In addition to the requirements set forth in sections 101 and
102, an invention under section 103 (“section 103”) must be nonobvious to be patentable.83 That is, if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are obvious, no patent will be
granted for that invention.84 Again, the focus is to earn a patent for
teaching and disclosing to the public something significant.
The Supreme Court applied section 103 in four steps: (1) determining the scope and content of the prior art, (2) ascertaining
the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, (3)
resolving the level of skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, and
(4) determining the obviousness of the subject matter against the
background of the first three steps.85
When determining the scope and content of the prior art, it is
generally accepted that printed publications, prior use or knowledge, United States patent applications, and another’s invention in
the United States, are relevant.86 Therefore, in contrast to novelty,
83. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952). Section 103 provides, in pertinent part:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id.
84. See id.
85. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). According to the
Graham court:
Under 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background,
the obviousness or non-obviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
Id.
86. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 60. Schwartz detailed the content of prior art
as including (1) printed publications or patents from anywhere in the world that were
published or issued before the applicant’s date of invention, (2) prior use or prior knowledge that occurred in the United States before the applicant’s date of invention, (3) a
United States patent application that subsequently issued and was filed before the applicant’s date of invention, and (4) another’s invention that was made in the United States
and was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed before the invention date of the invention in question. Id.
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a patent may be denied to an inventor if the invention is obvious in
view of one or more pieces of prior art, even though any single reference does not describe the invention identically.87
Moreover, whether an invention is patentable over the prior art
depends upon whether the subject matter of the claim, taken “as a
whole,” would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
at the time the claimed invention was made.88
5. Disclosure, Enablement, and Best Mode
Not only must an inventor teach—the inventor must teach correctly. When a patent is granted to an inventor, society’s right to
make, use, or sell an invention is deferred for a limited time in exchange for a disclosure that teaches the public how best to make
and use that invention.89 The disclosure of the invention in the patent is the quid pro quo for the grant of rights.90 The theory is
based on the assumption that the amount of goods and services will
increase because some secrets will be disclosed immediately and
used freely after the patent expires.91
The standard for disclosure set forth in section 112 requires
that the specification, i.e., the descriptive portion of the patent,
must contain a written description that enables any person skilled
in the art to make and use the invention, and set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor.92 Section 112 also mandates
that the inventor must claim the invention with definiteness.93 A
87. See id.
88. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (stating that a court must evaluate a “claim as a whole” and not unduly focus on
one facet of the claimed invention), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984); In re Yettito, 274
F.2d 953 (1960).
89. See O’Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 149.
90. See SCHLICHER, supra note 75, § 2.18[3].
91. See id.
92. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1975). According to section 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
93. Id. Section 112 states that “[t]he specification shall be concluded with one or
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claim is a brief, one-sentence definition of the invention for which
rights are granted.94 In summary, an adequate disclosure must contain an enabling written description, the best mode contemplated
by the inventor, and at least one definite claim.95
An enabling written description is considered the most important element of adequate disclosure.96 The inventor must describe
the invention clearly enough so one skilled in the field of the invention can make and use it without a great deal of experimentation.97 The inventor also must describe clearly what is actually
claimed in the patent.98
The “best mode” requirement forces the inventor to tell the
public the best embodiment that the inventor knows for practicing
the claimed invention.99 The applicant must disclose the invention
fully, including the relevant “tricks of the trade,” such as specific
techniques, instrumentalities, or characteristics for best putting the
invention into practice.100 Since 1965, courts have used this requirement to compel inventors to describe the most commercially
valuable embodiment of the invention, the most efficient way of
making it, and the most valuable way of using it known to the inventor at the time the application was filed.101
Finally, the requirement of claim definiteness ensures the public can discern the boundaries of the inventor’s legal right.102
Where the claims fail to apprise a skilled reader of the scope of the
invention, or whether they are broader than the invention justifies,
the Patent and Trademark Office is required to refuse to grant a
patent and the courts are required to hold it invalid if the Patent

more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards has his invention.” Id.
94. See SCHLICHER, supra note 75, § 7.02.
95. The requirement for an “enabled written description” is really two separate requirements, including “enablement” and “written description.” For the purpose of this
Note, however, they have been combined and treated as a single requirement.
96. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 516.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 517.
100. See O’Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 160.
101. See SCHLICHER, supra note 75, § 7.02.
102. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 516.
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and Trademark Office inadvertently grants it.103
The preamble is an introductory phrase of a claim that may
summarize the invention, its relation to prior art, or its intended use
or properties.104 According to one court, however, the preamble
may be more than mere introductory language, concluding that the
preamble is as significant as the claim filer desires.105 In fact, the
preamble itself has been found to act as a claim limitation to define
what is covered by the patent in precisely the same way as words
in the claim’s body.106
B. Medical Patent Infringement and Relief
Generally, a patentee enjoys the rights to stop infringers and
exact damages from them. Occasionally, the courts impose compulsory licenses when the act of stopping the infringers is inequitable or may cause the public harm. Courts are willing to deny injunctive relief when there is a substantial risk of harm to the public
interest, but seem less likely to deny injunctive relief when the patent is not a medical necessity or lifesaving device.107 This section
discusses infringement, the patent right to injunctive relief, and the
duty to provide compulsory licenses to infringers where the public
interest so mandates.
1. General Background
The Patent Act defines the rights granted to a patentee.108 The
103. See SCHLICHER, supra note 75, § 7.02[1][a].
104. See CHISUM, supra note 68, § 806[1](b).
105. See Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp.,
55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). According to the Bell Communications court:
[The] preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it. In
other words, when the claim drafter chooses to use both the preamble and the
body to define the subject matter of the claimed invention, the invention so defined, and not some other, is the one the patent protects.
Id.
106. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
107. See CHISUM, supra note 68, § 20.04.
108. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1980). According to section 154(a)(1):
Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United
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intellectual property rights of patent holders are often compared to
the real property rights of real estate owners.109 If a patent is
analogized to real property, its claims correspond to the metes and
bounds recited in a deed, and an infringer of those claims corresponds to a trespasser.110 The infringement of claims and the trespassing on real estate are both civil wrongs, but patent infringement is a statutory wrong, governed by federal law and defined
under section 271.111
Patent infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the construction of the meaning and scope of the asserted claim and second, the comparison of the accused device to the properly construed claim.112 Even though the construction of the meaning and
scope is purely a matter of law,113 the court may consider the language of the claim, the specification of the patent, and the prosecution history of the application for the patent in the Patent and
Trademark Office.114 Expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence may be used as an aid to understand the patent.115 Technical
treatises and dictionaries are preferred sources of extrinsic evidence.116
There are two types of infringement—literal infringement and
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Literal infringement occurs when each and every limitation of the patent claim exists, precisely as claimed, in the accused activity or device.117 In-

States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, . . . referring to the
specification for the particulars thereof.
Id.
109. See O’Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 151.
110. See D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW BASICS § 16.02, at 16-4 (1996).
111. Id. Section 271(a) provides that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the
patent, infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
112. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (creating two-part patent infringement test), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 979.
115. See id. at 980-81.
116. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
C.C.P.I. Inc. v. American Premier, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 813, 818 n.10 (D. Del. 1997).
117. See Johnston v. I.V.A.C. Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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fringement under the doctrine of equivalents “prevents a copyist
from evading patent claims with insubstantial changes.”118 Although application of this doctrine by the courts is rarely simple, it
is well-settled that there can be infringement under the doctrine
only if there is objective proof that any differences between the
claimed invention and accused device are merely “insubstantial.”119
Summary judgment may be appropriate in a patent case where
infringement is the issue to be decided, because “construction of a
patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within
the province of the court.”120 The standard for summary judgment
in a patent case is the same as in any other type of action.121
Summary judgment is appropriate only where the materials submitted for and against the motion show that “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.”122 The standard is high123 to avoid
depriving a party of its right to trial.124 Summary judgment is not
proper if evidence supporting a factual dispute is shown requiring a
trier of fact to resolve the parties’ differences at trial.125
Although patents are presumed valid, their validity may be
challenged in proceedings such as motions for summary judgment.126 Invalidity must be shown by clear and convincing evidence as to all material facts.127 To meet this high burden on summary judgment, a challenger must show that no fact material to the
issue of invalidity is in dispute, and that even if all material factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the patentee, the challenger is still
118. Valmont Indus. v. Reinke Mfg., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
119. Hilton Davis Chem., Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517-18
(Fed. Cir. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
120. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(creating two-part patent infringement test), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
121. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
123. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
124. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
125. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, 927 F.2d 1565, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
126. See 35 U.S.C. § 282.
127. See Key Pharm., Inc., v. Hercon Labs, 981 F. Supp. 299, 310 (D. Del. 1997).
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still entitled to judgment as a matter of law.128 Thus, the burden of
showing invalidity by summary judgment is higher than that of infringement, but involves much of the same analysis.129
If patent infringement is shown, equitable relief is normally
available to the patent owner under the law.130 For example, since
1819,131 courts have granted patent owners injunctive relief to prevent infringement of a patent.132 Over the years, two exceptions
developed to this principle, thereby denying injunctive relief in
certain circumstances. The first applies where an injunction would
cause substantial injury to the public interest.133 In that case,
courts require a patent owner to grant a compulsory license to the
infringer.134 The second applies where the detriment to the infringer severely outweighs the benefit to the patent owner.135 The
courts however, rarely use this exception.136 For the purposes of
this Note, the first exception is the most relevant.
128. See Continental Can Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1265
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
129. See, e.g., SmithKline Diagnostics v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that “claims must be interpreted and given the same meaning
for purposes of both validity and infringement analyses”).
130. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283-285.
131. See Act of February 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, 481-82 (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 283); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 97 n.503 (explaining that the Patent
Act of 1819 granted the federal courts “[u]pon any bill in equity [the] . . . authority to
grant injunctions, according to the course and principles of courts of equity . . . on such
terms and conditions as the said courts may deem fit and reasonable”).
132. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The King
Instruments court noted that:
The market may well dictate that the best use of a patent is to exclude infringing products, rather than market the invention . . . . Under this situation, the
Patent Act is working well. The patentee is deriving proper economic return on
its investment in acquiring a patent right. The public benefits from the disclosure of the invention and the ability to exploit it when the patent term expires.
Id. at 950. This strong public policy is often enforced by providing injunctive relief. Id.
at 960 (Nies, J., dissenting); see also B.F. Goodrich Flight Sys. Inc. v. Insight Instruments
Corp., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1832, 1844 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (opining that “all of society benefits
from the protection of patent rights, since it is the seed of inventive genius the Constitution and the statutes construing it seek ultimately to protect”).
133. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 98 n.505; Bliss v. Brooklyn, 3 F. Cas. 706
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 1,544).
134. See Bliss, 3 F. Cas. 706.
135. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 98 nn.506, 507.
136. See id.
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When the public interest is at issue, courts use an equitable balancing approach in deciding whether to award injunctive relief or
to require a compulsory license. For example, a court denied injunctive relief to an owner of a patent covering medical test kits
because of an overriding public interest.137 In fact, a number of
courts held that injunctive relief will not be awarded to a patent
owner when contrary to the notions of equity.138 One court went
so far as to conclude that, under section 1498 of title 28 of the
United States Code, the government may even be able to “take” an
invention if warranted by public interest concerns and provide
“adequate compensation” to the patent holder.139
Nonetheless, even when courts find that an injunction is contrary to the public interest, they have proposed creative solutions
that attempt to minimize public harm while respecting owners’
patent rights. One court granted a permanent injunction but provided a one-year grace period to the owner of a patent involving
rapid-exchange catheters.140 The grace period was apparently in137. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424-30 (1908)
(finding that a patent owner may enforce its rights under a patent irrespective of that
owner’s use of the invention); Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (C.D.
Cal. 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
138. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1500,
1517 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (denying an injunction to the owner of a patent covering surgical
cutters because to “suddenly withdraw these [cutting] devices from the market could have
a serious disruptive effect on surgical practice”); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis.
Alumni Research Found., 64 U.S.P.Q. 285 (9th Cir. 1945) (finding that public interest
was sufficient to deny an injunction on the process of irradiation of margarine); Ca. Med.
Prod. Inc. v. Emergency Med. Prod. Inc., 796 F. Supp. 640, 648 (D.R.I. 1992) (denying
injunctive relief because “[wlhile there is a public interest in product availability, it is
unlikely that the public would suffer from a shortage of extrication collars if the injunction were granted”).
139. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1995). It was
pointed out by Justice Nies, however, that this conclusion may only be possible if one
elevates rewards to patentees over other public interests. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
According to section 1498:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Claims
Court for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use
and manufacture.
28 U.S.C. § 1498.
140. See Schneider (Europe) A.G. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 813 (D.
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tended to minimize the impact to the medical community that
would otherwise occur if the infringing devices were removed
from the marketplace at once.141 By providing notice to the medical community that the infringer’s devices would not be available
after one year, that community apparently could anticipate and
prepare for the removal of the infringing devices.142 In Schneider,
the court concluded that even though a physician prefers an infringer’s device, which alone does not justify the denial of an injunction.143 It is noteworthy, however, that the court considered
important that alternative devices were available to physicians and
found that the infringer’s device was not significantly or objectively superior to other catheters in performance.144
In another patent case involving a catheter, the court agreed
that, although it was in the public interest to minimize the disruption in hospitals in terms of their selection of safety catheters by
denying injunctive relief, the disruption would best be minimized
by granting the preliminary injunction.145 The court held that if the
preliminary injunction was denied, the defendant might have persuaded additional hospitals to buy and use its safety catheter.146
Then, if the patentee succeeded in obtaining a permanent injunction at the trial, those additional hospitals would also be disrupted.147
Other courts have enforced injunctions against the manufacture
Minn. 1994). The Schneider court maintained that:
The permanent injunction . . . shall contain a one-year transition period to allow
an efficient and non-disruptive changeover for those institutions and physicians
who now employ the [infringer’s product] exclusively. Defendant shall pay
Plaintiffs a 15% royalty rate on Defendant’s sales . . . during that time. After
the transition period ends, the permanent injunction . . . shall take effect.
Id. at 861-62 (internal citations omitted).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id. (holding that the “physician preference of the infringer’s device does not
justify the denial of an injunction”).
144. Id. (noting that injunctive relief was granted because “all the non-infringing
catheters were not defective, unsafe, or incapable of performing as intended and required
during the medical procedure”).
145. See Critikon Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
1362, 1371 (D. Del. 1993).
146. Id. at 1373.
147. See id.
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of patented medical devices. One court granted a permanent injunction against an infringer’s sale of a cardiac defibrillation device.148 Another court granted injunctive relief to the patent holder
because the accused infringing device was not a “medical necessity.”149 Congress and the courts, however, have not substantially
elaborated on what is meant by the terms “medical necessity” and
“lifesaving devices.”150
2. With Respect to Medical Procedures
Ever since the constitutional grant of power of 1787, United
States patent law has attempted to define what constitutes patentable subject matter with respect to medical procedure patents.151
In Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary,152 the court upheld the
unpatentability of a surgeon’s use of ether on patients to minimize
suffering during surgery.153 The court concluded that even though
a discovery is brilliant and useful, it may not be patentable unless it
is “set to work,” and is in connection or combination with the
means by which, or the medium through which, it operates.”154
148. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1439, 1445 (E.D. Pa.
1988), rev’d & remanded, 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied, 879 F.2d 849 (Fed. Cir.
1989). According to the Eli Lilly court:
While the public interest is unquestionably advanced through the marketing of
potentially lifesaving devices [by denying injunctive relief] . . . , Congress has
determined it better for the nation in the long run to afford the inventors of
novel, useful and non-obvious products short-term exclusivity on such products
rather than to permit free competition in the goods.
Id.
149. Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Paragon Optical Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1033 (D.
Ariz. 1987).
150. Eli Lilly, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1441.
151. See CHISUM, supra note 68, § 1.03[3], at 1-70.
152. 17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1862).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 884. According to the Morton court:
A discovery may be brilliant and useful, and not patentable. No matter through
what long, solitary vigils, or by what importunate efforts, the secret may have
been wrung from the bosom of Nature, or to what useful purpose it may be applied. Something more is necessary. The new force or principle brought to
light must be embodied and set to work, and can be patented only in connection
or combination with the means by which, or the medium through which, it operates.
Id.
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Unfortunately, the rationale of Morton is less than clear, especially
when read as an application of the traditional rule that new analogous uses of old products are not patentable because the new use of
ether “seemed strikingly new and non-analogous.”155
Some twenty years after Morton, in Brinkerhoff v. Aloe,156 the
Supreme Court upheld the invalidity on a method of treating piles
and stated that “the methods or modes of treatment of physicians
of certain diseases are not patentable.”157 For authority, the Court
relied on Morton, but clearly stated the rational for the per se rule
excluding medical methods—namely, the uncertainty that any
medical method will achieve the desired result.158
About fifty years later, a court recognized the significance of
medical procedure patents and signaled a retreat from the rule set
forth in Brinkerhoff.159 Although relying in part on Morton, Dick
v. Lederle Antitoxin Laboratory,160 held that a method for performing a skin test was the proper subject of a patent because the test
was an “operable method.”161 Following Dick, a number of decisions retreated from the position that medical methods are unpatentable.162 In Ex parte Scherer,163 the per se rule of Brinkerhoff, in
which medical methods were found to be unpatentable, was overruled by the Board of Appeals for the Patent and Trademark Office.164 In Scherer, the Board of Appeals upheld the validity of a
patent on a method of injecting medicine by a pressure jet.165 The
Board of Appeals held that the utility, not the certainty of the results, should determine whether a medical procedure is patentable.166 One commentator, however, notes that Scherer is a
Patent and Trademark Office decision that serves as precedent only
155. CHISUM, supra note 68, § 1.03[3], at 1-71.
156. 146 U.S. 515 (1892).
157. Id. at 519.
158. Id.
159. See Dick v. Lederle Antitoxin Lab., 43 F.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
160. 43 F.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
161. Id. at 630.
162. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 187 n.49 (1987).
163. 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107 (1954).
164. See CHISUM, supra note 25, at 1-73.
165. Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. at 107.
166. See CHISUM, supra note 25, at 1-73.

ALTEN.TYP

1998]

9/29/2006 4:41 PM

ONE’S OWN DEVICES: MEDICAL PROCEDURE PATENTS

859

within that office and is limited to its context; it cannot be considered persuasive authority for the patentability of medical and surgical procedures generally.167
In Martin v. Wyeth,168 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the invalidation of two method claims on the basis of obviousness. The claims
merely applied an old device to a new use, but the new use was
analogous to former uses of the device.169 The court did remark,
however, that patents for medical or surgical methods have been
found valid,170 and it was assumed that “a medical or surgical
method may, if otherwise patentable, be placed in the category of
an art and therefore within reach of the statute.”171
Thus, until section 287(c) became law, neither Congress, the
courts, nor the United States Patent and Trademark Office introduced any special provisions for medical procedure patents, even
though Congress revised the patent statute four times since the Patent Act of 1790.172 There were no special hurdles to overcome in
order to obtain a medical procedure patent. The “utility” standard
set forth in Scherer, and the “operability” standard set forth in
Dick, remained the tests for determining the patentability of medical procedures inside and outside the Patent and Trademark Office,
respectively.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 287(C)
Although the enforcement of Pallin’s patent against a physician
in 1994 brought the controversy concerning medical procedure
patents to an apex, the controversy is not new.173 For example, in
the 1870s, the controversy became so heated that a dentist, who
was sued for patent infringement by the Goodyear Company on a
method of making rubber dentures, murdered a Goodyear Offi-

167. See id.
168. 96 F. Supp. 689, aff’d, 193 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1951).
169. See id. at 695.
170. See Ruskin v. Coe, 58 F. Supp. 424 (D.D.C. 1945); Dick v. Lederle Antitoxin
Lab., 43 F.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1921).
171. Martin, 96 F. Supp. at 695.
172. See Burch, supra note 36, at 1145.
173. See Medical Patent Bill, supra note 12.
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cer.174 Also, at about the same time, the press portrayed German
pharmaceutical companies as “blackmailing humanity” because
they obtained certain medical procedure patents.175
In response to these events, a House Committee on Patents in
1902 submitted to the House of Representatives a Report recommending the passage of House Bill 12451.176 House Bill 12451
sought to relieve medical and dental practitioners from “unjust
burdens imposed by patentees holding patents covering methods
and devices for treating human diseases . . . .”177 Before failing in
Congress, the bill was approved by thirty-eight state dental associations and would have allowed qualified dentists to perform operations “free of royalties for the benefit of society.”178 Many of
the objections cited by the Committee in support of the 1902 bill
are similar to the ones cited by modern proponents in support of
recent legislation,179 including objections on ethical, moral, and
lack of utility grounds.180 Nonetheless, the early legislation failed
and the controversy was put to rest for some time.
In response to the more recent Pallin controversy, Representative John Bryant of Texas again raised the issue of the patentability
of medical procedures in the House of Representatives in 1994.181
By March of 1995, the Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act (“House Bill 1127”) was introduced claiming to
address the issue of medical procedure patents by limiting their is174. See Ring, The Rubber Denture Murder Case: The True Story of the Vulcanite
Litigations, 32 BULL. HIST. DENT. 3 (1984).
175. Medical Patent Bill, supra note 12.
176. H.R. REP. NO. 57-2702 (1902).
177. Id. at 17.
178. Id. at 1 (explaining that the bill would have permitted “all legally qualified
dentists to freely perform various operations upon the mouth and teeth in the interests of
the public and of special benefit to the public health”).
179. See H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1334,
104th Cong. (1995).
180. See H.R. REP. NO. 57-2702, at 2. According to House Report 57-2702:
That patents of this sort are obnoxious and are useless in promoting the industrial arts is evident . . . . [T]hey interfere with the clear, moral [r]ight—in fact,
duty—of the physician and surgeon to do for his patents with his own hands
whatsoever may be required to effect a cure or relieve suffering.
Id.
181. See 140 CONG. REC. E1754 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1994) (statement of Rep. Bryant).
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suance.182 In October of 1995, an alternative act (“Senate Bill
1334”), which had the same name as the previous House version,
was introduced and claimed to address the purported problems associated with medical procedure patents by limiting their enforcement.183
Those bills were subject to judicial hearings, involving congressional testimony.184 The legislation that eventually became
law, however, was not subject to judicial hearings and contained
language not previously considered by the United States Congress.185
This part provides an accurate legislative history of the new
section 287(c). Accordingly, it discusses each of the precursor
bills considered by Congress that proposed limiting medical procedure patents, relevant congressional testimony, and various public
commentary. Finally, it describes the new section 287(c) and a
House Conference Report interpreting it.
A. House Bill 1127
Representatives Greg Ganske and Ron Wyden introduced
House Bill 1127 to the House of Representatives on March 3,
1995.186 If passed into law, House Bill 1127 would have prohibited the United States Patent and Trademark Office from issuing
patents on medical procedures, unless the claimed procedures were
used in combination with patentable medical products.187
1. Summary of House Bill 1127
House Bill 1127 stated that “a patent may not be issued for any
invention or discovery of a technique, method, or process for performing a surgical or medical procedure, administering a surgical
182. H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995).
183. S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995).
184. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20, at 134.
185. H.R. REP. NO. 57-2702.
186. H.R. 1127. House Bill 1127, introduced by Representatives Ganske and Wyden, proposed to preclude the issuance of a patent for any invention of a method or process for performing a surgical or medical procedure, administering a surgical or medical
therapy, or making a medical diagnosis. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-879 (1995).
187. See id.
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or medical therapy, or making a medical diagnosis . . . .” It provided an exception stating that patents may be issued “if the technique, method, or process is performed by or as a necessary component of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or
improvement thereof which is itself patentable subject matter, the
patent on such machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
may claim such technique, method, or process.”
2. Comments on House Bill 1127
House Bill 1127 was introduced to Congress primarily because
of lobbying efforts by the American Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery in the form of a coalition called the Medical Procedure Patents Coalition.188 Other medical organizations supported House Bill 1127, such as the American Medical Association
and the American Academy of Ophthalmology, by objecting to
medical procedure patents primarily on ethical, monetary, and
moral grounds.189
On October 19, 1995, the Congressional Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property held a hearing on House Bill
1127.190 Testimony was received from Congressmen, physicians,
patent attorneys, and other interested parties.191

188. See Silvy A. Miller, Should Patenting of Surgical Procedures and Other Medical Techniques by Physicians be Banned?, 36 IDEA 255, 255 (1996) (noting that the
American Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery included over fifteen medical associations, including the powerful American Medical Association).
189. See Miller, supra note 188, at 255; see also Todd R. Miller, The International
Suture: A comparative Approach to Patenting Methods of Medical Treatment, 78 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 443, 445 (1996).
190. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-879 (1995).
191. See id. The following individuals testified at the hearing: the Honorable Greg
Ganske, U.S. House of Representatives, 4th District, Iowa; the Honorable Ron Wyden,
U.S. House of Representatives, 3rd District, Oregon; G. Lee Skillington, Counsel, Office
of Legislative and International Affairs, Patent and Trademark Office United States Department of Commerce; Dr. Samuel L. Pallin, The Lear Eye Clinic, Sun City, Arizona;
Dr. Jack Singer, Hitchcock Clinic, Randolph, Vermont; Dr. Charles D. Kelman, President, American Society of Cataract & Refractive Surgery; Dr. William D. Noonan, Klarquist Sparkman Campbell Leigh & Whinston, Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law
Litigation and Licensing; Dr. H. Dunbar Hoskins, Jr., Executive Vice President, American Academy of Ophthalmology; and Mr. Donald R. Dunner, Chair, Section of Intellectual Property Law, American Bar Association. Id.
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Opponents of House Bill 1127 criticized the legislation as being over broad and vague.192 Although the bill categorically prohibited the patenting of certain types of medical processes, including performance of surgical or medical procedures, administration
of surgical or medical therapies, and making medical diagnoses,193
the legislation was criticized as not defining them.194 For example,
what constitutes a “surgical procedure” is subject to widely different interpretations.195 Also, the biotechnology industry, which relies heavily on patents to protect investments in research and development, expressed concern regarding the meaning of a “medical
therapy,” which they believed might reach their industry.196
The purportedly over broad language contained in House Bill
1127 may have created more problems than solutions.197 One
commentator asked what would happen “if a patented process is
granted under H.R. 1127 and later found to apply to humans?”198
In that case, the commentator asked whether it would be necessary
to rescind the patent.199
Furthermore, House Bill 1127 may have compelled doctors to
deceive the United States Patent and Trademark Office.200 For example, if House Bill 1127 became law, a doctor who might have
discovered an innovative medical procedure may have chosen to
hide the inventive aspect of the discovery by obtaining a patent for
an instrument capable of performing the procedure.201

192. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Mr. Baldino) (arguing
that many exciting new inventions in biotechnology involving new uses for old compounds would no longer be patentable); see also id. (statement of Dr. William Noonan)
(arguing that although it is desirable to limit patents on medical procedures in accordance
with foreign patent laws, House Bill 1127 would make United States patent law “much
more restrictive than even present European patent practices because it would ban U.S.
patents on new uses of known drugs or products of biotechnology”).
193. H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995).
194. See id.
195. Joel J. Garris, The Case for Patenting Medical Procedures, 22 AM. J.L. &
MED. 85, 104 n.186 (1996).
196. Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Mr. Baldino).
197. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. See id.
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Testifying before Congress, one physician argued that although
House Bill 1127 attempted to mitigate the purportedly over broad
terms by providing an exemption for procedures performed as a
necessary component of a patentable machine, the exemption was
rendered “meaningless”202 because an infringer of a patented process would already be an infringer of the patented machine, thereby
providing no additional patent protection and no motivation to disclose the procedure.203
Various legal associations opposed House Bill 1127 because of
the legislation’s generally flawed approach. For example, counsel
for the Office of Legislative and International Affairs, on behalf of
the Clinton administration, said that “excluding surgical and medical procedures from patentability” was not the proper way to address the issues concerning medical patents.204 Also, the Executive
Director of the American Intellectual Property Law Association,
Dr. Kirk, opposed the legislation because there was no demonstrated need for such legislation.205 In fact, Dr. Kirk argued that
the “underlying concepts of [House Bill 1127] is so failing in merit
that all of the technical problems are not worth addressing.”206
Also, House Bill 1127 may have allowed commercial predators
to unfairly benefit from research and development efforts of others,207 by making vendors immune to contributory infringement or
inducement of infringement.208 This benefit would have been to
the detriment to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies
because there would have been arguably little incentive to develop
new uses for available products.209
Moreover, because the legislative approach of House Bill 1127
would have limited certain subject matter from patentability, vari202. Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Kirk).
203. See id.
204. Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of G. Lee Skillington).
205. Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Kirk) (arguing that the
legislation would undesirably remove patent incentives and create an undesirable international precedent).
206. Id.
207. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Mr. Baldino).
208. See HARMON, supra note 54, at 238-243 (noting that both contributory infringement and inducement of infringement require direct infringement).
209. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Mr. Baldino).
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ous commentators have expressed concern that the bill may have
been in conflict with, and opposed to, our international position
encouraging the expansion of patentable subject matter. Although
this approach may have been technically in accord with Article 27
of the TRIPs Agreement,210 at least one commentator testifying before Congress argued that such exclusionary provisions were included in the TRIPs agreement only at the urging of developing
nations over the objections of the United States.211 Therefore, if
the United States wishes to narrow or eliminate such exclusionary
provisions, the United States should not simultaneously take advantage of them.212
No Judiciary Committee markups were held on House Bill
1127. Nonetheless, by March of 1996, the House Bill 1127 had
129 cosponsors, including 25 Democrats and 103 Republicans.213
The biotechnology industry, however, wanted to add language to
the bill to which the Medical Procedure Patents Coalition would
not agree.214 Thus, the bill never passed into law.
B. House Bill 3814
In response to the criticisms of House Bill 1127, Representative Ganske introduced a modified version as an amendment to
1997 appropriations legislation House Bill 3814.215 Unlike House
Bill 1127, the Ganske amendment would have cut the United
States Patent and Trademark Office’s funding in 1997 for issuing
patents for new medical procedures, except as a necessary component of a patentable medical device or machine.216
210. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
211. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Kirk) (maintaining
that Article 27 allows member nations to exclude diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical
methods for the treatment of humans or animals as well as plants and animals other than
micro-organisms).
212. See id.
213. See Garris, supra note 195, at 101 n.172.
214. See Keven Murphy, Procedure Patent Bills Face Hefty Opposition, OCULAR
SURGERY NEWS, Dec. 15, 1995, at 13.
215. See 142 CONG. REC. H8030 (1996) (noting that Rep. Ganske “offered” House
Bill 3814).
216. See H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996).
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1. Summary of House Bill 3814
The Ganske amendment217 states that no funds made available
by the appropriations bill could be used by the United States Patent
and Trademark Office to issue medical procedure patents, including methods for performing a surgical procedure,218 performing a
medical procedure,219 or making a medical diagnosis.220 The
amendment made two exceptions to this rule.221 The first exception was for a procedure performed by or as a necessary component of a patentable machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.222 The second exception occurred when the patent was for “a
new use of a composition of matter or biotechnological process.”223
2. Comments on House Bill 3814
Representative Ganske explained to the House of Representatives that House Bill 3814 “borrows from and improves” the original language of House Bill 1127.224 In particular, Representative
217. Id. House Bill 3814 is also referred to as the Ganske amendment because Representative Ganske introduced it. See 142 CONG. REC. H8030 (noting that Rep. Ganske
“offered” House Bill 3814).
218. H.R. 3814. House Bill 3814 defines a surgical procedure as a “treatment for
curing or preventing disease, injury, illness, disorder, or deformity by operative methods,
in which human tissue is cut, burned, or vaporized by the use of any mechanical means,
laser, or ionizing radiation, or the penetration of the skin or body orifice by any means.”
Id.
219. Id. House Bill 3814 defines a medical procedure as a “nonsurgical, nondiagnostic procedure for curing or preventing a disease, injury, illness, disorder, or deformity.” Id.
220. Id. House Bill 3814 defines a medical diagnosis as the “identification of a
medical condition or a disease or disorder of a body.” Id.
221. Id. According to House Bill 3814, “[t]he limitation established in Subsection
(a) shall not apply to the issuance of a patent when it is made known to the Federal official having authority to obligate or expend such funds that . . . .” Id.
222. Id. Under House Bill 3814, the exception occurs when:
[T]he patent is for a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or improvement thereof, that is itself patentable subject matter, and the technique,
method, or process referred to in Subsection (a) is performed by or is a necessary component of the machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . .
Id.
223. Id.
224. 142 CONG. REC. H8254, at H8277 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Ganske).
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Ganske set out five policy reasons that the legislation should be
supported.225 First, patient access to new surgical and medical procedures is being threatened by medical patents;226 second, medical
patents permit patent owners to charge monopoly prices and
contribute to our Nation’s health care costs;227 third, physicians
have an obligation to share their knowledge and skills for the
benefit of humanity;228 fourth, medial patents are not necessary for
the advancement of medicine;229 and fifth, 80 countries around the
world already prohibit medical patents.230
Representative Ganske maintained that House Bill 3814 was
different from House Bill 1127 because it would ensure that all
“presently patentable new drugs . . . machinery and devices for
treating and diagnosing disease . . . biologic products . . . new uses
for nonpatentable drugs and biological products” would have remained patentable.231 Representative Ganske also emphasized during its introduction that the law, if the bill were passed, would not
prohibit patents on gene therapy or other similar procedures.232
Nonetheless, the biotechnology industry rejected the proposed legislation because of a belief that it would “undermine the patenting
of gene therapy treatments.”233
Moreover, the legislation was opposed on procedural grounds
because it was attached as a rider to the House appropriations bill,
a non-substantive bill that funds the Departments of Commerce,
Justice and State—a procedure that the Senate generally “eschews.”234 Accordingly, during the introduction of House Bill
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. 142 CONG. REC. H8254, at H8277 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Ganske).
232. Id. Representative Ganske stated that House Bill 3814 contained “an additional exception for biotechnological process to make absolutely clear that this amendment does not, let me repeat, does not prohibit patents on gene therapy or other similar
procedures.” Id.
233. Bill with PTO Finding and Patent Reform on Medical Procedures Is Signed
into Law, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), Oct. 7, 1996, at D5.
234. BIO gets House backing on SBIR, but loses on procedure patents,
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3814, various Representatives argued against inclusion of the Ganske amendment on procedural grounds.235 Representative Rogers
also argued that the Patent and Trademark Office had been conducting public hearings on issues related to medical procedure patents and proposed that they should “address the issues raised by
the legislation by modifying their internal, administrative procedures.”236 However, this was not the case when Representative
Ganske introduced his amendment.237
House Bill 3814 was also opposed on substantive grounds,
primarily on charges of being over broad and vague.238 Representative Dooley argued that the law was so broad that it would affect
up to a third of all biotechnology patents in the United States.239
One patent attorney considered the amendment so vague that he
dubbed it the “patent lawyers full employment act.”240

BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Aug. 19, 1996, at 3.
235. See 142 CONG. REC. H8254, at H8277 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statements of
Rep. Rogers, Rep. Moorhead, and Rep. Mollohan). Representative Rogers agreed that it
is “a very important subject that needs to be addressed by the authorization committee,”
but he was “in reluctant opposition to the amendment . . . on a procedural basis . . . .” Id.
Representative Moorhead maintained that the amendment should be rejected because the
“subject matter” of the bill was “within the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee” and
the problems addressed by the amendment might be better remedied by modifying the
“internal, administrative procedures” at the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Id. Representative Mollohan, in opposition to the amendment, argued that the amendment was “not the appropriate [subject of this] bill” and “should best be decided by the
authorizing committee.” Id.
236. 142 CONG. REC. H8254, at H8277 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Rogers).
237. See Bradley J. Meier, The New Patent Infringement Liability Exception for
Medical Procedures, 23 J. LEGIS. 265, 272 (1997).
238. See 142 CONG. REC. H8278. According to Representative Dooley, the “language is far too broad.” Id. (statement of Rep. Dooley). Representative Kennedy attacked the language as well; while agreeing “with the underlying fundamental goal of this
amendment,” he maintained that the bill was flawed because it bans all medical procedure patents and “creates two somewhat vague exceptions.” Id. (statement of Rep. Kennedy). Representative Kennedy also noted that the amendment “has been likened to cutting one’s fingernails with a chain saw.” Id. In addition, Representative Schroeder
argued “that the problems identified by the medical profession relating to patents on
medical and surgical procedures can be solved by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
through steps that are less drastic . . . .” Id. (statement of Rep. Schroeder).
239. Id. (statement of Rep. Dooley) (“The broad implications of the language
threaten to invalidate up to one-third of all the biotech patents in the United States.”).
240. Julie Rovner, Congress moves to restrict medical-procedure patents, LANCET,
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An important difference between House Bill 1127 and the
amendment contained in House Bill 3814 is that the amendment
prevented the United States Patent and Trademark Office from using funds appropriated by the appropriations bill to issue patents on
certain medical procedures, rather than prohibiting their issuance
outright.241 Accordingly, the bill was criticized as not addressing
the purported “underlying problem.”242 Also, the bill was an appropriation bill for a single fiscal year, i.e., 1997, making it at best
a temporary solution.
On July 24, 1996, Ganske’s legislation was passed by the
House243 as an amendment to the Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Appropriations bill.244 The legislation, however, later died
in the Senate.245
B. Senate Bill 1334
Due to the strong opposition to the approaches taken in House
Bill 1127 and House Bill 3814, Senator Frist, in favor of limits on
medical procedure patents, introduced Senate Bill 1334 as an alternative.246 Unlike the former approaches, which either limited the
issuance of certain medical procedures or restricted funding for the
granting of such patents, Senate Bill 1334 would have created an
infringement liability exception for medical professionals using
patented medical procedures.247

Oct. 12, 1996, at 1025 (quoting David Schmickel, patent counsel for the Biotechnology
Industry Organization), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
241. H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996).
242. Ganske Wins Ban on Licensing Medical Methods, HEALTH LEGISLATION &
REGULATION, July 31, 1996 (noting that Senator Frist said that he “want[s] to treat the
underlying problem, not stop funding one of the symptoms”), available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, ARCNWS File.
243. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,023, at S12,023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Frist) (noting that the legislation passed in a 295-128 vote).
244. See id.
245. See Meier, supra note 237, at 271.
246. See 141 CONG REC. S15291, at S15291 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Frist) (noting that Senator Frist introduced Senate Bill 1334, also entitled the “Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act”).
247. S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995).
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1. Summary of Senate Bill 1334
Senate Bill 1334 would have amended section 271 of title 35 of
United States Code by adding new subsection (j).248 The legislation stated that it would not be infringement for certain persons to
use certain patented methods,249 or to use or induce others to use
certain patented medical processes.250 The legislation also stated
that it would not apply to patented procedures used by persons
having a commercial interest in a regulated drug, medical device,
process, or other product.251
The terms “device” and “drug” would have the same meanings
as the same terms defined in sections 201(h) and (g) of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.252 The terms “health care entity”
and “licensed health care entity” would mean any entity that provides health care services.253 The terms “patient,” “physician,”
“product,” “professionally affiliated with” and “state” were defined
in various subsections of the legislation.254
2. Comments on Senate Bill 1334
Senate Bill 1334 was the subject of congressional testimony on
October 19, 1995. Senate Bill 1334 was criticized by a physician
as an attempt to fix “a fundamentally unsound and conceptually
flawed” proposal by narrowing its exclusionary provisions where
there were “policy or political impediments to enactment of the
legislation.”255
It was also attacked because it provides physicians “unprecedented special rights to a professional group, giving them the ap248. See 141 CONG REC. S15291, at S15291 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Frist).
249. S. 1334.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g), 321(h) (1994).
253. S. 1334. Under section 271(j)(2)(C) and (D), the terms “health care entity”
and “licensed health care entity” means a “for-profit or nonprofit entity that provides
health care services, including a hospital, medical school, health maintenance organization, group medical practice, or a medical clinic.” Id.
254. Id.
255. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,846 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Dr.
Kirk).
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pearance of being ‘above the law.’”256 One commentator also
pointed out that for this reason, Senate Bill 1334 might conflict
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.257 In fact,
Senate Bill 1334 was dubbed “doubly discriminatory” because it
discriminated based on the field of invention of technology and the
identity or profession of the infringer.258
According to some commentators, although Senate Bill 1334
was not intended to immunize commercial suppliers, such suppliers may exploit the immunity through health care entities under a
literal interpretation of the bill.259 Senate Bill 1334 states that it is
not infringement for “a health care entity with which a physician or
licensed health care practitioner is professionally affiliated,” to use
or induce others to use a patented technique.260 The term “health
care entity,” means a “for-profit or non-profit entity that provides
health care services.”261 Therefore, if a commercial interest would
have provided materials used in a patented method performed by
such a health care entity, that commercial interest may have been
immune from infringement as well.262
Even if a commercial interest was found liable for infringement
under Senate Bill 1334, the result may be inequitable.263 In particular, the term “health care entity” may include a person “engaged in a commercial sale.”264 In that case, it may have been inequitable for a willfully infringing health care entity, such as a
health management organization buyer of drugs, not to share liabil-

256. Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Noonan).
257. See Garris, supra note 195, at 104.
258. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Mr.
Hatch letter); see also Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Noonan)
(arguing that the approach of 1334 is “unpalatable because it grants unprecedented special rights to a professional group, giving them the appearance of being ‘above the law,’
and inviting other groups to claim similar immunity”).
259. See Murnane & Kole, supra note 22, at C19.
260. S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995).
261. Id.
262. See Murnane & Kole, supra note 22, at C19 (“It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which the health care entity, which may be for-profit or non-profit, enters into a
lucrative relationship with a commercial supplier that provides materials used in the patented method.”).
263. Id.
264. S. 1334.
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ity with the commercial interest, the manufacturer of those
drugs.265
Furthermore, some commentators argue that Senate Bill 1334
may have been ambiguous as to whether a physician participating
in the sale of a medical product would have been exempted from
the immunity granted to physicians by the bill.266 Although a person participating in the sale of certain regulated products or processes is exempt from immunity, the bill does not require these
regulated products or processes to be related to any patented
method.267 Therefore, a physician may be immune to patent infringement, even when that doctor participates in the sale of unrelated patented medical products.268
A possible advantage to Senate Bill 1334 over the other versions of legislation is that it would only have limited the enforceability, not prohibited the issuance, of such patents, thereby having
the benefit of not affecting the procedures of the United States Patent and Trademark Office.269
Senate Bill 1334 may have also been superior to House Bill
1127 because the approach taken in Senate Bill 1334 was arguably
more consistent with the approach taken in section 271(c) of title
35 of the United states Code—the related patent statute.270 Section
271(c), also known as the “clinical trial exemption,” states that it is
not an act of infringement to use or sell a patented invention solely
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under federal laws that regulate drugs or veterinary
biological products.271 Like section 271(c), Senate Bill 1334 states
that it is not an act of infringement for certain individuals to use or
induce others to use certain medical methods.272 Therefore, like
265. See Murnane & Kole, supra note 22, at C19.
266. See id.
267. See id. (“The Frist bill exempts from immunity any person engaged in the
commercial manufacture, sale or offer for sale of regulated drugs, medical devices or
processes, without linking such items with the patented method to which immunity is attached.”).
268. See id.
269. S. 1334
270. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Mr. Kelman).
271. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1) (1994).
272. S. 1334.

ALTEN.TYP

1998]

9/29/2006 4:41 PM

ONE’S OWN DEVICES: MEDICAL PROCEDURE PATENTS

873

section 271(c), Senate Bill 1334 exempts certain acts from being
acts of infringement.273
The remedy restrictive approach, however, taken by Senate Bill
1334 may not achieve an important intended result of the legislation—the prevention of lawsuits against medical practitioners for
the practice of patented medical procedures.274 Because expensive
discovery proceedings would probably have been required before
the merits of the case could be judged, the legislation likely would
not have provided the relief sought by practitioners.275 One commentator argued that Senate Bill 1334 would actually increase litigation through a combination of a failure to reduce existing litigation and additional litigation over the meaning and effort of the
legislation itself.276
Furthermore, House Bill 1334 may not have precluded enforcement against those involved in the commercial manufacture
of drugs or medical devices “subject to the regulation under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Domestic Act or the Public Health Service Act.”277 In effect, this approach would have provided patent
protection only to medical methods that require approval by the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). Because this approach
would have made patentable only those medical procedures subject
to regulatory review—thus making the scope of patentable protection flexible—the approach was arguably superior to House Bill
1127 and House Bill 3814.278 The approach, however, may be
flawed because some believed it to undesirably expand the scope
of FDA review to reach the medical practice.279
273. Id. Unlike Section 271(c), however, the acts defined by Senate Bill 1334 are
not related to government regulation. Id.
274. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,846 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from
Dr. Kirk).
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. H.R. 1334.
278. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Noonan) (“The
scope of patent protection would also be flexible, and could expand if the jurisdiction of
the FDA was enlarged.”).
279. See id.; see also 142 CONG. REC. S12,023, at S12,023 (daily ed. Sept. 30,
1996) (statement of Sen. Frist). According to Senator Frist, such legislation would “inject patent-seeking in the heart of medicine” and “undermine the peer review process,”
thereby opening the door for more expansive FDA regulation. 142 CONG. REC. S12,023,
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D. Senate Bill 2105
On September 24, 1996, Senator Frist introduced a bill that he
believed struck a balance between various competing interests.280
On one hand, Senator Frist believed that medical patents, other
than for procedures, required patent protection to attract capital for
research and development.281 On the other hand, he worried that
patent infringement suits involving doctors and other health care
professionals would have several undesirable consequences.282 In
any case, Senate Bill 2105 died before making it to the House.
E. Section 616 of House Bill 3610
Although Senate Bill 2105 never passed into law itself, it initiated a legislation chain reaction that led to section 287(c).283 Its
passage into law took less than one week and included language
not in any previous bill.284
On September 28, 1996, with a vote of 370 to 37, House Bill
3610 was passed by the House after an all-night session.285 During
that session, the House chose not to amend the bill, opting to pass
it without amendment to the Senate for consideration.286 Because
House Bill 3610 was sent to the Senate as a conference agreement,
at S12023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Frist). Senator Frist also noted
that, “[w]hile the FDA regulates medical devices and pharmaceuticals, it has no authority
to regulate the general practice of medicine . . . .” Id.
280. See id.
281. Id.
282. Id. According to Senator Frist, patent infringement suits involving health care
practitioners may lead to undesirable results. Id. First, health care costs could explode if
doctors charged licensing fees for every new surgical or medical techniques they developed. See id. Second, it could greatly jeopardize patients’ rights to privacy. See id. In
order to know if a patent was infringed upon, patent holders could demand access to surgical notes and other detailed medical records to know precisely which procedures were
used. See id. Third, allowing pure procedure patents could undermine the medical community’s tradition of freely exchanging information for the benefit of patients. See id.
And fourth, it could open the door to FDA regulation of all aspects of medical practice,
instead of the current regulation of only medical devices and pharmaceuticals. See id.
283. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
284. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,049, at S12,049 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1996) (statement of
Mr. Lott).
285. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,815, at S11,816 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement
of Mr. Lott).
286. See id.
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it could not be amended; it was only subject to an up or down
vote.287 The Senate passed House Bill 4278 on September 30, by a
vote of 84-15,288 and also passed House Bill 3610, which was
signed by the President that evening.289 House Bill 3610 contained
section 287(c), which deprives owners of medical procedure patents the right to seek damages or injunctive relief when such patents are infringed by certain health care providers.290
1. Summary of Section 287(c)
Section 287(c)(1) provides “medical practitioners” engaged in
“medical activity” with immunity from the provisions contained in
sections 271, 281, 283, 284, and 285.291
Under section
287(c)(2)(A), the term “medical activity” is defined as the “performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body,” but does
not include the use of patented machines, practices, or processes.292
Section 287(c)(2)(B) defines the term “medical practitioner” to
mean “any natural person who is licensed by a State to provide the
medical activity described in Subsection 287(c)(1) or who is acting
under the direction of such a person in the performance of the
medical activity.”293 Section 287(c)(2)(C) defines the term “re-

287. See id.
288. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,049, at S12,049 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1996) (statement of
Mr. Lott).
289. See id.
290. H.R. 3610, 104th Cong. (1996).
291. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1). Section 287(c)(1) states that:
With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance, of a medical activity that
constitutes an infringement under Section 271 (a) or (b) of this title, the provisions of Sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the
medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such
medical activity.
Id.
292. Id. § 287(c)(2)(A). Section 287(c)(2)(A) defines the term “medical activity” to
mean “performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body,” but does not include:
(i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such patent,
(ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such
patent, or
(iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.
Id.
293. Id. § 287(c)(2)(B).
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lated health care entity” as “an entity with which a medical practitioner has a professional affiliation under which the medical practitioner performs the medical activity.”294
Under section
287(c)(2)(D), the term “professional affiliation” is defined as “staff
privileges, medical staff membership, employment of contractual
relation, partnership or ownership interest, academic appointment,
or their affiliation under which a medical practitioner provides the
medical activity on behalf of, or in association with, the health care
entity.”295 Section 287(c)(2)(E) defines the term “body” as a “human body, organ or cadaver, or a nonhuman animal used in medical research or instruction directly relating to the treatment of humans.”296 According to section 287(c)(2)(F), the term “patented
use of a composition of matter” does not include “a claim for a
method of performing a medical or surgical procedure on a body
that recites the use of a composition of matter where the use of that
composition of matter does not directly contribute to achievement
of the objective of the claimed method.”297 Section 287(c)(2)(G)
defines the term “state” as “any state or territory of the United
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.”298
Section 287(c)(3) exempts certain activities performed by
commercial interests from section 287(c).299 Specifically, “persons
engaged in the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter or the provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory services . . . .”300 Section 287(c)(3)(A) and (B) defines the type of exempted activities.301 According to section 287(c)(3)(A), the exempted activity must be “directly related” to certain commercial

294. Id. § 287(c)(2)(C). Section 287(c)(2)(C) further defines a related health care
entity as “including, but not limited to, nursing home, hospital university, medical school,
health maintenance organization, group medical practice, or a medical clinic.” Id.
295. Id. § 287(c)(2)(D).
296. Id. § 287(c)(2)(E).
297. Id. § 287(c)(2)(F).
298. Id. § 287(c)(2)(G).
299. Id. § 287(c)(3).
300. Id.
301. Id. §§ 287(c)(3)(A), 287(c)(3)(B).
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activities.302 Under section 287(c)(3)(B), the exempted activity
must also be “regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Public Health Service Act, or the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act.”303
2. House Report 2702
According to House Report 2702, section 287(c) is intended to
“preclude the filing of civil action” for damages or injunctive relief
“against a medical practitioner” or a “related health care entity”
who performs a medical activity that would otherwise constitute an
infringement or inducement to infringe under section 271.304 Under section 287(c)(2)(A), there are three exceptions to the definition of “medical activity.”305
The House Report explained that the term “patented use of a
composition of matter,” under section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii), is limited
by section 287(c)(2)(F)306 and, under section 287(c)(2)(F), does not
include any claim for performing a medical or surgical procedure
on a body that recites the use of the composition of matter where
the use of the composition of matter does not “directly contribute”
to the achievement of the objective of the claimed method.307
Also, the House Report explained that a use of a composition
of matter as a step in a claim “will direct[ly] contribute” to the
achievement of the objective of the claimed method if it is “novel
or if it contributes to or is necessary to establish the nonobviousness of the claim as a whole.”308 In addition, when each of
the method steps in a method claim recites a “use of a composition

302. Id. § 287(c)(3)(A). According to section 287(c)(3)(A), the activity must be
“directly related to the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory services (other than clinical laboratory services provided in a
physician’s office) . . . .” Id.
303. Id. § 287(c)(3)(B). According to section 287(c)(3)(B), the activity exempted
by section 287(c)(3) must also be “regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, the Public Health Service Act, or the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act.” Id.
304. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
305. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (c)(2)(A).
306. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
307. Id.
308. Id.
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of matter,” the claim cannot represent a “medical activity” because
the use of a composition of matter must necessarily contribute to
the novelty and, therefore, to the objective of the claimed
method.309 Moreover, “[u]ses of compositions of matter” include,
without limitation, a wide variety of novel uses and methods.310
The House Report offered the treatment for diabetes as an example
of a claim that does not fall within the scope of a “medical activity.”311
The House Report also introduces the concept of a “hybrid”
claim.312 In order to determine whether a “hybrid” claim is exempted from the definition of a “medical activity,” the test established by section 287(c)(2)(F) must be applied.313 The hybrid
claim is not a “medical activity” when it includes the patented use
of a composition of matter that directly contributes to the objective
of the claim.314
The test set forth in the House Report has two parts.315 Before
applying the two-part test, however, the hybrid claim must be divided into (1) steps that recite the use of composition of matter,
namely, composition steps, and (2) steps that do not recite the use
of a composition of matter, namely, procedure steps.316 The first
part of the test determines the objective of the claimed method taking into account all of the process steps set forth in the claim.317
The second part of the test determines “whether the steps involving
309. Id.
310. Id. The House Report expressly included the following novel uses and methods: “novel uses of drugs, novel uses of chemical or biological reagents for diagnostic
purposes, novel methods for scheduling or timing administration of drugs, novel methods
for combining drug therapies, and novel methods for providing genetic or other biological materials to a patient (including gene therapies).” Id.
311. Id. The example claim recites that “only the novel use of a drug for the treatment of diabetes that involves the administration of a drug at a particular time of day
and/or at a specified dose and/or with a specified concomitant medicinal therapy could
not be construed as a medical activity.” Id.
312. Id. The House Report defines a hybrid claim to be “a claim with at least one
step that recites the use of a composition of matter and at least one step that is not directed to the use of a composition of matter (e.g., a surgical step) . . . .” Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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the use of one or more compositions of matter either alone or in
combination contribute directly to the achievement of the objective
of the claimed method.”318
According to the House Report, when the “uses of the compositions of matter, either individually or collectively, represents
novel subject matter, or if one or more of these steps contributes to
or are necessary to establish the non-obviousness of the claim as a
whole,” the hybrid claim is not a medical activity.319 Therefore,
when one or more steps that use compositions of matter are combined with one or more steps that involve collectively obvious
medical or surgical techniques to produce a novel and non-obvious
method, the ones that use compositions of matter “may still directly contribute,” as defined by section 287(c)(2)(F), thereby making the hybrid claim exempt from section 287(c).320
Section 287(c)(2)(A) provides for procedures that do not constitute a “medical activity.”321 The House Report provided an example of a surgical procedure that qualifies as a medical activity.322 The example involves the transplantation of a healthy heart
into a patient with a diseased heart, including “administering a
conventional anesthetic” and performing “a novel and non-obvious
surgical transplantation procedure.”323 Under the test set forth in
the House Report, that procedure is not a patented use of a composition of matter within the meaning of section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).324
Therefore, assuming none of the other exceptions apply,325 the surgical procedure qualifies as a “medical activity.” In contrast, the
House Report explains that “where the administration of the anes318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. According to House Report 104-2702:
[E]ven where the steps involving uses of one or more compositions of matter
are not novel individually or in combination with each other, these uses may
still directly contribute to the achievement of the objective of the claimed
method if, in combination with the steps that involve collectively obvious
medical or surgical techniques, they produce a novel and non-obvious method.
Id.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A).
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
Id.
Id.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 287(c)(2)(A)(i), 287(c)(2)(A)(ii), 287(c)(2)(A)(iii).
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thesia was accomplished . . . using a novel anesthetic or a novel
dosing schedule,” the procedure would fall within the meaning of
section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii) and the procedure would not qualify as a
medical activity.326
The House Report also purports that the determination of
whether section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii) applies, can be decided by a motion to dismiss or summary judgment,327 and proposes a twopronged test for making such a determination.328 An accused infringer would “ordinarily prevail” under the two prong test if the
accused infringer can show “by clear and convincing evidence”
that the recited uses of the compositions of matter, both individually and collectively, lack novelty, and “by a preponderance of the
evidence” that the medical or surgical procedure steps are, by
themselves, novel and non-obvious, thereby allowing the accused
infringer to concede non-obviousness instead of making the required evidentiary showing.329
Section 287(c)(2)(A)(iii) excludes from the definition of
“medical activity” the practice of a patented process in violation of
a biotechnology patent.330 The House Report explains that for
purposes of this provision, the definition of the term “biotechnology patent” includes patents on a (1) “biotechnological process” as
defined in section 103(b), and (2) the “process of making or using
326. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). According to House Report 104-2702,
“the objective of the claimed method would include the provision of a novel use of an
anesthetic in transplantation surgery and the use of the composition of matter (i.e., the
anesthetic) would directly contribute to the achievement of the objective.” Id.
327. Id. (“It is intended that the applicability of the exception in 287(c)(2)(A)(ii) for
a patented use of a composition of matter can usually be decided by a motion to dismiss
or summary judgment under Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.”).
328. Id.
329. Id. The House Report notes that the movant must show:
(1) . . . by clear and convincing evidence that the recited uses of the compositions of matter, both individually and collectively, lack novelty, and
(2) . . . by a preponderance of the evidence that the steps of the claimed method
that do not involve uses of compositions of matter (i.e., the medical or surgical
procedure steps) are, by themselves, novel and non-obvious, provided, however, that the movant may concede the non-obviousness in lieu of making the
required evidentiary showing.
Id.
330. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii).

ALTEN.TYP

1998]

9/29/2006 4:41 PM

ONE’S OWN DEVICES: MEDICAL PROCEDURE PATENTS

881

biological materials, including treatment using those materials,
where those materials have been manipulated ex vivo at the cellular or molecular level.”331 Moreover, “biological materials” include “a variety of cellular, intracellular, extracellular, and acellular substances.”332 Additionally, “ex vivo manipulation” includes
“propagation, expansion, selection, purification, pharmaceutical
treatment, or alteration of the biological characteristics of these
substances outside of a human body.”333 Therefore, medical procedures that do not involve ex vivo cellular or molecular manipulation of a biological material are excluded from section
287(c)(2)(iii).334 The House Report explains that a heart transplantation surgery that includes the use of a heart-lung machine is excluded from section 287(c)(2)(iii) because the manipulation is not
ex vivo, and not at the cellular or molecular level.335
3. Comments on Section 287(c)
The Medical Procedure Patents Coalition, again led by the Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery, supported the legislation.336 Specifically, the Medical Procedure Patents Coalition supported the language exempting certain activities relating to
331. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
332. Id. According to House Report 104-2702:
Cellular substances include (but are not limited to) cultured microbial and
mammalian cells. Intracellular substances include (but are not limited to) genetic materials, such as DNA and RNA that is obtained from within the cell.
Extracellular substances include (but are not limited to) proteins and other
molecules that are secreted or excreted by cells. Acellular substances include
(but are not limited to) viruses and other vectors for transmitting genetic material.
Id.
333. Id.
334. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(iii).
335. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
336. See Medical Patent Bill, supra note 12. The other members of the Medical
Procedure Patents Coalition are the American Academy of Dermatology, American
Academy of Ophthalmology, American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, American
Academy of Otolaryngology—Head and Neck Surgery, American Association of Neurological Surgery, American College of Radiology, American College of Surgeons, American Institute of Ultrasound in Medicine, American Medical Association, American Society of Dermatologic Surgery, American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery,
American Urological Association, Association of American Medical Colleges, Society of
Cardiovascular and Interventional Surgery, and the Society of Vascular Technology. Id.
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commercial development and distribution and provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory services, which effectively broadened
the exemption already objected to by Dr. Kirk.337
One aspect of the legislation related to claims involving the
patented use of a composition of matter. This aspect narrows the
scope of the exemption by requiring that that use “directly contribute to [the] achievement of the objective of the claimed
method.”338 According to Dr. Kirk, this aspect of the legislation
was a matter of fact, and thus unlikely to be resolved at the pleadings or motion stages of litigation.339 Therefore, for the same reasons that Senate Bill 1334 would not have avoided costly and timeconsuming litigation between physicians, this legislation would not
have as well.340
Legislative proponents, however, argued that the history of the
legislation would establish the clear legislative intent required to
resolve such fact intensive matters by motion to dismiss or summary judgment.341 Nevertheless, as Dr. Kirk testified, legislative
history is not controlling when in conflict with the rules of civil
procedure.342 For example, a proponent suggests that a movant for
summary judgment under Rule 56343 should ordinarily prevail if
certain essential facts are shown by a “preponderance of the evidence.”344 According to Dr. Kirk, however, such a suggestion expressly conflicts with Rule 56, which states that a party should
prevail only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.”345
According to a letter written by Senator Orrin Hatch, there
were too many unresolved issues to “sweep” the legislation into an
end-of-the-session omnibus appropriations bill.346 In particular,
337.
Kirk).
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
Kirk).
345.
346.

142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,846 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Dr.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,846 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Dr.
Id.
142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Mr.
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Senator Hatch objected to the amendment on procedural grounds
because the proposal was never the subject of hearings or amendments in either the House or Senate.347 Senator Hatch also objected to the legislation because of its undesirable precedent setting
nature for United States trade policy.348
III. SECTION 287(C) IS VAGUE, DISCRIMINATORY, AND INEFFECTIVE
This Note proposes a three-part analytic framework for determining whether a defendant should be granted relief under section
287(c)(1). It analyzes two exemplary medical procedure patents
under this proposed framework and identifies problems inherent in
the current statute. The proposed framework is necessary because
section 287(c) is vague, discriminatory, and ineffective at solving
the purported problems that motivated its enactment.
A. Analytical Framework
This Note proposes the following three-part analytical framework for determining whether a party is entitled to relief under section 287(c)(1).
1. “With Respect to a Medical Practitioner”
The first part of the three-part analysis involves determining
whether the performance of an accused infringer is “with respect to
a medical practitioner.”349 This determination depends upon
whether the defendant is a medical practitioner.350 Section
287(c)(2)(B) provides that the term “medical practitioner” encompass any person licensed by a state to provide the medical activity
described in section 287(c)(1), or any person acting under the direction of such a person in the performance of the medical activity.351 If the performance by an accused infringer is not “with reHatch letter).
347. Id. (noting that there was no “purported emergency”).
348. Id. According to Senator Hatch, the Senate Finance and House Ways and
Means Committees should have consulted with the United States Trade Representative
before this legislation was brought up for a vote. Id.
349. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (1996).
350. See id.
351. § 287(c)(2).
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spect to a medical practitioner’s performance,” a defendant cannot
seek relief under section 287(c)(1).352
2. “A Medical Activity”
The second part of the three-part analysis determines whether
the claimed procedure is directed to “a medical activity.” A medical activity is a medical or surgical procedure on a body. Under
section 287(c)(2)(E), a body must be human or nonhuman.353 If
nonhuman, the body must be used in research or instruction “directly relating to the treatment of humans.”354 Therefore, a performance on a “human” body would be a medical activity, but the
same performance on a “nonhuman” body would likely generate
substantial litigation depending on how “directly related” that performance is to the treatment of humans.355
The term “medical activities” does not cover three circumstances.356 The three exceptions are the use of a patented machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such a patent, the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in
violation of such a patent, and the practice of a process in violation
of a biotechnology patent.357
According to the exception in section 287(c)(2)(A)(i), a “medical activity” does not include the use of patented technology such
as a “patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in
violation of such patent.”358 Although not yet addressed in the
case law, patented technology apparently could be covered by another claim in the same patent as the one also claiming the medical
procedure or in a claim of an entirely different patent.
The question of whether a medical procedure uses a patented

352. § 287(c)(1).
353. Id. § 287(c)(2)(E).
354. Id.
355. See discussion supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (describing the term
experimental use). A better approach to protecting experimental and research use would
be analogous to the experimental use exception under section 102(b), 35 U.S.C. § 102(b),
which is already established and substantially tested.
356. § 287(c)(2)(A) (1996).
357. Id.
358. § 287(c)(2)(A)(i).
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technology would likely be answered in a two-step inquiry analogous to the conventional two-step infringement inquiry set forth in
Markman.359 This two-step procedure would first require establishing the meaning and scope of the claimed “patented technology,” and then a comparison of the properly construed meaning
and scope of the claimed “patented technology” with the activity
and equipment use of the medical practitioner. The first step
would be used to determine if any patented technology exists360
and then to establish the meaning and scope of any claims to any
such patented technology. The second step would determine
whether the performance of the medical practitioner is in violation
of that patented technology. Thus, a medical practitioner seeking
relief under section 287(c)(1) might be required to prove noninfringement of other patented technologies conceivably embodied
in any of several unrelated patents.361 Alternatively, the patentee
may be required to prove that the exception applies after the medical practitioner proves a prima facie case. In either case, there appears to be an additional litigation burden on the medical practitioner.
Any Markman-like inquiry would likely be time-consuming
and expensive. Taking guidance from Markman, the first question
to be addressed under section 287(c) regarding the meaning and
scope of the patent claim would be a matter of law,362 and the second question regarding the comparison of the properly construed
claims with the physician’s performance of the medical practitioner would be a question of fact, to be submitted to a jury.363 Although the first question is a question of law, a court can use intrinsic and extrinsic evidence in deciding that question.364 Such
359. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(creating two-part patent infringement test), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
360. The term “patented” in this context is vague. It is unclear whether the term
refers to technology covered by any patent or just by United States patents. Also, it is
uncertain whether the term includes enforceable patents only. If so, it appears that this
exception would illogically and inequitably depend on the enforceable status of one or
more completely independent patents.
361. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1).
362. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(creating two-part patent infringement test), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
363. See id.
364. See id. at 979.
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evidence includes patents, their prosecution histories,365 and any
evidence external to the patents and prosecution histories, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.366
Thus, determining the answer to the threshold question of the
meaning and scope of a patented technology may pose a substantial burden on the physician. Moreover, determining the answer to
the second question by comparing the meaning and scope with the
practitioner’s performance, which is purely a matter of fact, may
impose an even higher litigation burden on the medical practitioner. The analysis required to determine the answers to those questions would likely require substantial resources on behalf of the
medical practitioner defendant. This is in contrast to section
287(c)’s proponents’ purported objective of preventing the rise in
cost of health care.367
In fact, coupling a defendant’s immunity in a medical procedure patent infringement suit to another patent infringement unfairly and unreasonably increases the burden on the practitioner.
In order to avoid infringement of a medical procedure patent, a
medical practitioner may be required to argue non-infringement of
a second unrelated patent. This is without precedent. In addition
to increasing the burden on the medical practitioner, the pairing is
undesirable because it provides a motive for medical patent owners
to instigate additional unrelated patent infringement suits. The incentive to file additional suits surely could not have been an intended result of section 287(c)(1).368
According to the exception in section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii), a medical activity does not include “the practice of a patented use of a
composition of matter in violation of such patent.”369 In contrast to
the first exception, which concerns the use of patented technology,

365. See id.
366. See id. at 980 (“This evidence may be helpful to explain scientific principles,
the meaning of technical terms, and terms of art that appear in the patent and prosecution
history. Extrinsic evidence may demonstrate the state of the prior art at the time of the
invention.”).
367. See Scerra, supra note 18, at 28.
368. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1).
369. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).
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the second exception concerns the patented use of a composition of
matter.370
The term “patented use of a composition of matter” is limited
by subsection 287(c)(2)(F),371 which states that a patented use does
not include a patented method that uses a composition of matter
not “directly contribut[ing]” to the achievement of the claimed
method’s objective.372 The House Report states that a patented use
will directly contribute if that use is “itself novel or if it contributes
to or is necessary to establish the non-obviousness of the claim as a
whole.”373 Thus, to show that a use “directly contributes,” the defendant may have to prove that the use of the composition of matter is not itself novel or does not contribute to or is not necessary to
establish the non-obviousness of the claim as a whole.374
If a medical practitioner fails to prove that the use of the composition of matter in a step of the claim does not contribute to or is
not necessary to establish the non-obviousness of the claim as a
whole, the defendant’s case may be harmed while the patentee’s
case is advanced. This result may arise because the defendant may
undesirably establish that the remaining portion of the claim is
non-obvious. In other words, medical practitioners would have little incentive to prove that the use of the composition of matter does
not contribute to or is not necessary to establish the nonobviousness of the claim as a whole, and patentees would correspondingly not endeavor to prove the opposite.375 This strange result suggests that the proposed method for resolving whether a use
370. Id.
371. § 287(c)(2)(F). According to section 287(c)(2)(F):
The term “patented use of a composition of matter” does not include a claim for
a method of performing a medical or surgical procedure on a body that recites
the use of a composition of matter where the use of that composition of matter
does not directly contribute to achievement of the objective of the claimed
method.
Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. (“A use of a composition of matter as a step in a claim will directly contribute to the achievement of the objective of the claimed method if it is itself novel or if it
contributes to or is necessary to establish the non-obviousness of the claim as a whole.”).
374. Id.
375. Moreover, a party would be averse to challenging novelty because of the heavy
burden of showing identity between prior art and the claimed invention.
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“directly contributes” is untenable.
Moreover, no provision except section 287(c) makes the remedy available to a patent owner in any way contingent on less than
all of the steps of a claim.376 In fact, nowhere else does the patentabilty or enforceability of a claim depend solely on the novelty
or non-obviousness of a step; they always depend on the claim
when taken “as a whole.”377 Indeed, proving the novelty or nonobviousness, or lack thereof, of one or more individual steps places
a burden on the patentee, or the medical practitioner, respectively,
that is even greater than the burden already met by the patentee in
order to obtain the patent. At least for this reason, the novel and
non-obviousness step test places an unprecedented burden on litigants that both contravenes logic and departs completely from traditional American patent law.
The House Report also suggests an undesirable strategy for determining whether a “performance of a medical or surgical procedure” falls within the exception defined by section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii)
for two categories of claims.378 The first category includes medical procedure claims in which every step of the claim recites a “use
of a composition of matter.”379 The second category includes
medical procedure claims having at least one step that recites such
a use and at least one step that does not.380 The House Report refers to those claims as “hybrid” claims.381 The strategy is undesirable because the applicability of the exception under section
287(c)(2)(A)(ii) hinges on the vagaries of claim drafting, rather
than on the substantive issue of whether the claim is directed to an
intended type of medical performance.382
Furthermore, the House Report submits that a claim in the first
category “cannot represent a ‘medical activity’ because the use of a
composition of matter [in each of the method steps] must necessarily contribute to the novelty and, therefore, to the objective of the
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
O’Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 149.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
Id.
See id.
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).
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claimed method.”383 The House Report lists a series of qualifying
examples of “uses of compositions of matter,” but states that the
list is not exhaustive, and specifically qualifies the list with the
phrase “includes, without limitation.”384 The House Report provides an example of a claim that uses a composition of matter that
is not a medical activity, that is, one that recites only the novel use
of a drug for the treatment of diabetes involving the administration
of a drug at a particular time or at a certain dose or with a specified
concomitant medicinal therapy.385 The House Report gives no examples, and thus gives no guidance, as to when a use would not
qualify.386
The House Report incorrectly asserts that the use of a composition of matter in “each” claimed step must mean that it directly
contributes to the achievement of the objective.387 This is because
the claim draftsperson may have included the use of the composition of matter in each step unnecessarily, or even inadvertently.388
The claim’s novelty may reside in an aspect of the steps other than
the use of the composition of matter, especially because the claim
was considered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
with respect to the claim as a whole,389 not with respect to a particular use of a composition of matter.
For example, every step of a surgical claim might use a composition of matter because it is preferable, not because it contributes
to the novelty of the claim or the achievement of its objective. To
illustrate, each step of a surgical technique might include “flushing” a region with water or saline solution. Flushing water would
be a use of a composition of matter. In this case, however, the
flushing may merely improve the results of the otherwise novel
claim.
383. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. This rule provides a clever patent prosecutor a means to evade section
287(c)(A)(1) by merely adding conventional uses of such compositions to each step in
claim. This would be particularly simple in single step procedure claims where the use of
a flushing agent would be standard practice.
389. See O’Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 149.
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The House Report submits that a claim in the second category,
a hybrid claim, has “at least one step that recites the use of a composition of matter and at least one step that is not directed to the
use of a composition of matter.”390 A two-step test for analyzing a
hybrid claim is included in the House Report.391 The first step is to
determine “the objective of the claimed method taking into account
all of the process steps set forth in the claim.”392 The second step
is to “determine whether the [claimed] steps involving the use of
one or more compositions of matter either alone or in combination
contribute directly to the achievement of the objective of the
claimed method.”393
In practice, neither determination would be easy. The first step
involves determining only one objective of the claimed method.394
This task may be difficult—or even impossible—because a single
invention may have many objectives.395 The second step involves
determining whether the claimed steps involving the use of the
compositions of matter alone or in combination directly contribute
to the achievement of the objective found in the first step.396 Such
a determination would be unprecedented, requiring detailed analysis on the level of one or more steps. The question whether any
claimed steps “directly contribute to the achievement of the objective” is entirely new. Therefore, the process of answering such a
question would likely require litigation.
Yet another significant problem with the House Report’s categorical approach is its undesirable dependence on the structure of
the claim at issue.397 Claim drafting is an art, and the structure of a
claim is flexible. What constitutes a claimed “step” is in many

390. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996); see also supra note 320 (quoting House
Report 104-2702).
391. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Often, multiple objectives of an invention are listed in the summary of the invention. See, e.g., Method of Preventing Repetitive Stress Injuries During Computer
Keyboard Usage, United States Patent No. 5,638,831 (issued June 17, 1997) [hereinafter
Repetitive Stress Patent] (including fifteen objects of the invention).
396. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
397. Id.
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cases merely a matter of how the claim was drafted.398 Thus, the
question as to whether “each of the method steps” includes the use
of a composition of matter could be compounded by the additional
question of what constitutes a step.399
For example, a method claim includes one or more steps, but
each of the steps may itself be a combination of sub-steps. The
difference between a step and a sub-step is often a matter of formality, with no substantive basis. Thus, a two-step claim, including one step that recites the use of a composition of matter and one
step that does not, could be combined into a one-step claim having
two sub-steps.400 Determining whether such a two-step claim is a
“medical activity” requires the two-step analysis suggested by the
House Report.401 If the form of the claim were changed, however,
by combining the steps to include a single step, it must include the
use of a composition of matter, and the claim could not be a medical activity under the exception defined by section
287(c)(2)(A)(ii).402 Thus, the determination of what constitutes a
medical activity under this exception undesirably depends on the
form of the claim.403
The House Report also proposes a two-part test for determining
whether a motion to dismiss or summary judgment can be used to
determine whether an accused infringer falls within the second exception.404 Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)405 or for summary judgment under Rule 56406 are not practical tools for resolving the issue of whether a medical procedure falls under the
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. This is especially true if both steps are to be performed simultaneously.
401. Id.
402. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).
403. Moreover, the House Report’s proposed analysis does not address the role of a
claim’s preamble. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). The preamble of a claim
might include the use of composition of matter. It is not clear how such a use in the preamble would affect the two-part test.
404. Id. (“It is intended that the applicability of the exception in 287(c)(2)(A)(ii) for
a patented use of a composition of matter can usually be decided by a motion to dismiss
or summary judgment under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
405. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
406. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
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exception defined under section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).407
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) would likely not reduce the likelihood of medical procedure patent litigation.408 As a rule, dismissal of a suit for failure to
state a claim is considered a drastic measure, and rarely occurs.409
The Supreme Court has held that a complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief.”410 Therefore, a court must assume, for
purposes of deciding a motion, that the medical procedure patent
owner will prove any necessary factual allegations.411 Because
such motions are rarely successful, the availability of such a motion would likely not prevent, or even reduce, litigation.
Also, a motion to dismiss under Rule 56 would not lower the
likelihood of medical procedure patent litigation.412 Under Rule
56(c), a summary judgement may be rendered only if “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact.”413 A court may therefore
only consider the undisputed material facts of the case.414 Then,
only using the undisputed facts, “the moving party is entitled to a
judgement as a matter of law.”415 A patent owner, however, need
only dispute material facts to make such a judgement unlikely or
impossible. Therefore, a motion for summary judgement under
Rule 56 would likely not prevent litigation because the existence of
even one material fact in dispute, renders summary judgement impossible.416
A medical practitioner has different burdens of proof for each
of the two conditions suggested by the House Report.417 The ra407. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).
408. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
409. See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, EXAMPLES
290 (2d ed. 1992).
410. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
411. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
412. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
413. Id. 56(c).
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).

AND
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tionale for requiring “clear and convincing evidence” of the lack of
novelty in the recited uses of the compositions of matter, while requiring “a preponderance of the evidence” demonstrating that the
medical or surgical procedure steps are novel and non-obvious is
uncertain.418 Under this framework, a medical practitioner would
have a disincentive to try to prove that certain steps of the claim at
issue are, by themselves,419 novel and non-obvious.420 Thus, not
only does the burden of proof for the two conditions appear arbitrary, but satisfying them could also be hazardous for an accused
infringer.
Even if a defendant met the burdens of proof, thereby preventing a trial, the defendant would still have been subject to substantial pre-trial litigation. The minimum burden on a defendant would
be to show that the recited uses of the compositions of matter lack
novelty.421 A determination of novelty under section 102, however, may not be trivial.422 Moreover, nothing under the law prevents a patent owner from bringing a patent infringement suit.
Such a suit may be desirable to obtain a declaration of infringement for proving contributory infringement under section
271(c),423 for which no relief is provided in section 287(c).424
Thus, even if a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) or a motion for
summary judgement under Rule 56 were granted, the substantial
burden of pre-trial litigation would not be avoided.
According to the exception in section 287(c)(2)(A)(iii), a
medical activity does not include “the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.”425 The House Report explains
that a biotechnology patent includes a patent on a biotechnological
418. Id.
419. The phrase “by themselves” is ambiguous. The phrase could refer to steps of
the claimed method that do not involve uses of compositions of matter in combination or
individually. This question would likely be another source of litigation.
420. The House Report indicates that a medical practitioner may concede nonobviousness instead of making the required evidentiary showing. See H.R. CONF. REP.
NO. 104-2702.
421. This is true in the unlikely event that the practitioner concedes that the medical
or surgical procedure steps are novel and non-obvious.
422. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 51.
423. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
424. § 287(c).
425. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).
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process, as defined in section 103(b),426 as well as a patent on a
process of making or using biological materials, including treatment using those materials, where those materials have been manipulated ex vivo at the cellular or molecular level.427 Nevertheless, the House Report’s proffered definition of a biotechnology
patent does not help medical practitioners avoid litigation.
The question of whether a medical procedure falls under the
third exception would likely be answered in the two-step Markman-like inquiry described with respect to the first and second exceptions.428 In this case, it would include establishing the meaning
and scope of claimed “biotechnology patent,” and comparing the
properly construed meaning and scope of the claimed subject matter with the performance of the medical practitioner.
As is the case with the first and second exceptions,429 an inquiry in the case of the third exception is also undesirable. Chief
among these reasons is the substantial burden of pre-trial litigation.
In addition, the third exception has further weaknesses. The precise definition of what constitutes a biotechnology patent is so
vague and potentially broad that the third exception arguably swallows the rule set forth in section 287(c)(1).430
The first type of biotechnological patent is a “biotechnological
process,” as defined by a relatively new and complicated statute,
namely, section 103(b)(3).431 There is no case law construing the
scope and meaning of that definition. Thus, any use of section
287(c) could lead to substantial litigation over the intended meaning and scope of the term biotechnological process.
The second type of biotechnological patent is a patented process of making or using biological materials manipulated ex vivo at
the cellular or molecular level. The House Report defines a biological material very broadly, including cellular, intracellular, ex426. § 103(b).
427. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
428. See discussion supra note 358 and accompanying text (describing the exception under section 287(c)(2)(A)(i)); discussion supra notes 306-329 and accompanying
text (describing the exception under section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii)).
429. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 287(c)(2)(A)(i), 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).
430. § 287(c)(1).
431. § 103(b)(3).

ALTEN.TYP

1998]

9/29/2006 4:41 PM

ONE’S OWN DEVICES: MEDICAL PROCEDURE PATENTS

895

tracelluar, and even acellular substances.432 The House Report
does not provide a single example of a material that would not
meet the definition of “a biological material.”433 Furthermore, the
definition of “ex vivo manipulation” is so broad that the exception
defined by section 287(c)(2)(A)(iii) practically engulfs the rule.434
“Ex vivo manipulation” of a biological material includes “propagation, expansion, selection, purification, pharmaceutical treatment,
or alteration of the biological characteristics of these substances
outside of a human body.”435 This inclusive definition is so broad
that nearly any patented process performed on any biological substance outside a human body appears to be included.
Thus, the third exception is over broad and ineffective at reducing patent litigation. Accordingly, any application of the third exception, as defined by section 287(c)(2)(A)(iii), would not advance
the policy goal voiced by many of its proponents, that is, protecting doctors from such litigation.436
3. “Constitutes an Infringement”
The third part of the proposed three-part analysis will only be
reached if the questions raised in the first and second parts of the
analysis are affirmatively answered. Otherwise, the liability exception available under section 287(c) would be unavailable.437
This third part involves determining whether the medical activity constitutes an infringement under Sections 271(a) or 271(b).438
Section 271(a) states that “who[m]ever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the
patent.”439 Section 271(b) states that whomever “actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”440 Thus,
but for new section 287(c)(1), a medical activity would otherwise

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii).
Id.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
§§ 271(a), 271(b).
§ 271(a).
§ 271(b).
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constitute infringement if a medical practitioner either makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells the claimed invention, or induces the same.441
According to section 287(c)(1), if the medical activity constitutes an infringement in accordance with step three, no remedy for
infringement would be available to the patent owner, including injunctions, damages, and attorney fees, against the medical practitioner or a “related health care entity” with respect to the medical
activity.442 Under section 287(c)(2)(C), a “related health care entity” is an entity with which a medical practitioner has a “professional affiliation” under which the medical practitioner performs
the medical activity.443 Under that section, a health care entity
may be, but is not limited to, a nursing home, hospital, medical
school, or health maintenance organization.444 Under section
287(c)(2)(D), a “professional affiliation” is broadly construed to
be, among other things, employment contracts and ownership interests.445
Any application of this third part would not likely cause substantial litigation because infringement under sections 271(a) and
271(b) would most likely be conceded by a defendant wishing to
obtain immunity in a patent infringement suit. The statute is nevertheless discriminatory because it provides a liability exception
only for medical practitioners and related health care entities. As a
result of the discriminatory nature of section 287(c),446 it fails to
protect medical patients, who are not medical practitioners nor related health care entities, from patent infringement suits arising
from the performance of unauthorized medical procedures, including lifesaving procedures.447 For this reason, section 287(c) does
not solve the purported problem with medical procedure patents of
restricting life-saving medical procedures.

441. §§ 271(a), 271(b).
442. § 287(c)(1).
443. § 287(c)(2)(C).
444. Id.
445. § 287(c)(2)(D).
446. § 287(c).
447. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2207 (1996). The Heimlich maneuver is an example of a medical procedure that, if patented, would arguably not be protected by section 287(c).
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B. Two Medical Procedure Patents Examples
The proposed three-part analytical framework would determine
whether section 287(c) would be applied to a defendant. To illustrate the mechanisms of this structured inquiry, it will now be applied to two distinct patent claims in the United States, that is, Patent Numbers 5,638,831 and 4,886,831.
1. Brown: United States Patent Number 5,638,831
In 1997, New York concert pianist Stephanie Brown was issued a United States patent for her method of preventing repetitive
stress injuries while using a computer keyboard.448 Brown developed the technique for musicians and later adapted it to computer
keyboard operations.449 The method prevents repetitive stress injuries by providing “a natural line” between the hand, wrist, and
forearm.450
The Brown method includes five steps.451 In the first step, the
hand and wrist move in a straight line so that the forearm forms a
natural line position.452 In the second step, the hand reaches for an
object while allowing the elbow to follow the hand naturally.453 In
the third step, the hand and wrist are angled sideways relative to
the forearm.454 In the fourth step, the hand, wrist, and forearm are
returned to the natural line position.455 And in the fifth and last
step, the hand is placed on a keyboard while maintaining the natu-

448. See Repetitive Stress Patent, supra note 395.
449. See id.
450. Id.
451. Id. The Brown method reads as follows:
A method for providing a natural line between the hand, wrist and forearm,
comprising the steps of: moving the hand and wrist in a straight line with the
forearm thereby forming a natural line position reaching for an object with the
hand and allowing the elbow to follow the hand naturally; angling the hand and
wrist sideways relative to the forearm, thereby forming an angled wrist position; returning the hand, wrist and forearm to said natural line position; and
placing the hand on a keyboard while maintaining said natural line position.
Id.
452.
453.
454.
455.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ral line position.456
The proposed three-part framework is now applied to the
Brown method. Summarizing, the three-part framework involves
determining whether (1) the performance of an accused infringer is
“with respect to a medical practitioner,” (2) the claimed procedure
is directed to “a medical activity,” and (3) the medical activity constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or 271(b).
The first step involves determining whether the claimed
method is with respect to a medical practitioner’s performance.457
According to section 287(c)(1), claim 1 is with respect to a medical
practitioner’s performance if it is performed under the direction of
a medical practitioner.458 Conversely, if a medical practitioner is
not performed under such direction, the claim would not be with
respect to a medical practitioner’s performance.459
The second step involves determining whether the claim is directed to a medical activity. A medical activity, as defined by section 287(c)(2)(A), means a “medical or surgical procedure on a
body,” but does not include the three exceptions expressly defined
in the section.460 The Brown method is probably a medical activity
because it does not appear to fall under any of the three exceptions.
Claim 1 of the Brown patent probably does not fall under the first
exception because it does not involve the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.461 Nor does claim 1
of the Brown patent fall under the second exception because there
is no use of a composition of matter, let alone a patented use of
one.462 Finally, claim 1 does not fall under the third exception because it does not involve the use of a biotechnology patent, as defined by section 103(b).463
The third step of the proposed analysis involves determining
whether the medical practitioner’s performance constitutes direct
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

Id.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1)
Id.
Id.
§ 287(c)(2)(A)
See § 287(c)(2)(A)(i).
See § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).
See § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii).
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infringement under section 271(a) or inducement to infringe under
section 271(b).464 A court would likely find direct infringement, if
the medical practitioner practices the method himself, or inducement to infringe, if the practitioner encourages someone else to
practice the claimed method.465 The nature of the claimed method,
however, probably precludes the making, offering to sell, or selling
of the invention.
Thus, the availability of relief under section 287(c)(1) depends
on the identity or profession of the patient. If the patient is a medical practitioner (or under the direction of a medical practitioner),
the activity falls within the meaning of section 287(c)(1).466 In that
case, relief under section 287(c) would be available to an accused
infringer.467 If the patient is not a medical practitioner (nor under
the direction of a medical practitioner), however, the activity
would not fall within the meaning of section 287(c)(1) and relief
would not be available.468 This leads to the inequitable result that
medical practitioners can practice the patented invention with immunity while the general public can not. Clearly, this is neither
desirable nor intended.
Moreover, section 287(c)(1) fails to advance the policy goals
voiced by many of its proponents.469 One such goal was to prevent
restriction of useful medical procedures by the public, including
relatively simple ones like the Heimlich maneuver.470 A direct
comparison of the Brown method to a hypothetical claim covering
the Heimlich maneuver illustrates this point. Like the Heimlich
maneuver, the Brown method can be used without a medical practitioner and practiced without the aid of any patented device or
drug. And, for the same reasons that the Brown method is a medical activity, a hypothetical claim covering the Heimlich maneuver
would also by a medical activity. Being such, both the Brown
464. See §§ 271(a), 271(b).
465. See §§ 271(a), 271(b). Infringement would be determined under a two-step
Markman-like analysis. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (creating two-part patent infringement test), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
466. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1).
467. § 287(c).
468. § 287(c)(1).
469. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
470. See id.
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method and the Heimlich maneuver would not be protected under
section 287(c)(1), and performance by the public would therefore
be punishable under the law.471 Thus, even though section
287(c)(1) is available, the public still would not be entitled to
freely practice either of the claimed procedures. This result is
clearly not consistent with the policy goals voiced by the proponents of section 287(c)(1).472
Thus, while the public would not be permitted to use the
Brown method, or the Heimlich maneuver, if patented, medical
practitioners would be allowed without restriction. Accordingly,
section 287(c)(1), like its statutory predecessor Senate Bill 1334,473
creates a discriminatory infringement liability exception for medical practitioners.474 Moreover, section 287(c)(1) further discriminates based on the field of invention, i.e., medical procedures as
opposed to other type of procedures.475 If the intended result of
section 287(c) is to make patented medical procedures available
with less restriction, the exemption should apply to all patients, regardless of their identity or profession.476
2. Marcos: United States Patent Number 4,886,831
In 1989, a patent for the medical uses of phycocyanin was issued to N. Charlie Marcos.477 The Marcos method describes a
photochemical method for treating atherosclerosis or cancer.478
The Marcos method includes three steps.479 In a first step, a
471. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1).
472. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).
473. S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995).
474. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1).
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. See Medical Uses For Phycocyanin, United States Patent No. 4,886,831 (issued Dec. 12, 1989) [hereinafter Phycocyanin Patent].
478. Atherosclerosis is characterized by irregularly distributed lipid deposits that
may lead to a variety of more serious conditions. See ILLUSTRATED STEDMAN’S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 136 (24th ed. 1982). Cancer is usually characterized by malignant growths
or tissue. See id. An advantage of the Marcos treatment is that the atherosclerotic
plaques and cancer growths are selectively destroyed with little or no damage to the surrounding healthy cells or tissue. See Phycocyanin Patent, supra note 477.
479. Id. The Marcos patent reads as follows:
A method for treating atherosclerosis by destroying atherosclerotic plaques
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physiologically compatible solution containing an effective amount
of phycocyanin is intravascularly injected.480 In a second step,
means for irradiating the plaques in contact with the phycocyanin
is intravascularly inserted.481 And, in a third step, the plaques are
irradiated for a period of time effective to destroy the plaques with
the means for irradiating.482
The proposed three-part analytical framework is now applied to
the Marcos method. First, a performance is “with respect to a
medical practitioner,” when the defendant is a medical practitioner
or under the supervision of a medical practitioner.483 Invasive
techniques, especially ones that involve intravascular insertion of
medical devices, are almost certainly procedures within the domain
of a medical doctor. Such a doctor would either be licensed by a
state or under the direction of one (as in the case of a clinical internship).484 Thus, it is more likely than not that any performance
of the Marcos method would be with respect to a medical practitioner.
A medical activity under section 287(c)(2)(A) must be a
“medical or surgical procedure on a body,” but may not fall under
any of the three statutory exceptions.485 Clearly the Marcos
method is a medical procedure; the question is whether it satisfies
an exception. Unfortunately, the determination of whether any of
these exceptions applies requires answering many vague and factbased questions.
Under the first exception, a “medical activity” does not include
comprising:
a. Intravascular injection of a physiologically compatible solution containing an
effective amount of phycocyanin to effect contact of said phycocyanin with
said atherosclerotic plaques;
b. Intravascular insertion of a means for irradiating said plaques in contact with
said phycocyanin with light of certain wavelengths; and
c. Exposure of said plaques to said means of irradiating light for period of time
effective to destroy said plaques.
Id.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.

Id.
Id.
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(B)
See § 287(c)(2).
Id. § 287(c)(2)(A).
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the use of a “patented technology.”486 The question of whether a
given performance of the Marcos method is in violation of a patented technology requires (1) establishing the meaning and scope
of claimed patented technology, and (2) comparing the properly
construed meaning and scope of the claims with the performance
of the medical practitioner. The first step of the Marcos patent
calls for the use of a “physiologically compatible solution containing an effective amount of phycocyanin.”487 Thus, if the solution
was separately patented, the medical practitioner’s performance
could be in violation of the patent covering the solution. Moreover, the second and third steps of the Marcos method call for the
use of a “means for irradiating.”488 Thus, if that means were separately patented, the medical practitioner’s performance could also
be in violation of the separate patent covering the means.
In either case, a doctor who practiced the Marcos method
might have to show non-infringement of both of those viable patented technologies in order to obtain relief under section 287(c)(1)
with respect to the original medical procedure patents.489 The
more patent infringement suits brought against a medical practitioner, the more thinly limited resources must be spread to defend
against the suits. Due to the increased risk inherent in multiple
litigation, a medical practitioner would be even less likely to prevail unscathed, especially if juries are involved. If the medical
practitioner is found to infringe just one patented technology, relief
under section 287(c)(1) would be unavailable.490 The additional
litigation burden created by section 287(c)(1) could not have been
one of the results intended by its proponents.491
Under the second exception, a practice of the Marcos method
would not be a medical activity if it included “the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent,”
unless that use does not directly contribute to the achievement of

486. See supra note 360 (discussing the uncertainty surrounding the term patented).
487. Phycocyanin Patent, supra note 477; see also supra note 479 (quoting the Phycocyanin Patent).
488. Phycocyanin Patent, supra note 477.
489. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1).
490. Id.
491. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).

ALTEN.TYP

1998]

9/29/2006 4:41 PM

ONE’S OWN DEVICES: MEDICAL PROCEDURE PATENTS

903

the objective of the claimed method. The first step of the Marcos
method uses a “physiologically compatible solution containing an
effective amount of phycocyanin.”492 The Marcos patent itself explains that there are at least two other patented procedures for delivery and irradiation of phycocyanin in atherosclerotic arteries.493
Thus, any analysis of the Marcos method would probably include
analysis of those two patents.
This analysis must determine if the use of the physiologically
compatible solution “directly contributes” to the achievement of
the objective of the Marcos patent. The use of the physiologically
compatible solution will directly contribute if it is “itself novel or
if it contributes to or is necessary to establish the non-obviousness
of the claim as a whole.”494 Any determination of novelty would
probably be contested, at least in light of the prior art disclosed in
the Marcos patent and any other art that may be discovered along
the way. Therefore, any determination regarding the nonobviousness of the Marcos method in view of its use of the solution would require the establishment of a new fact-based standard.
Moreover, litigants would be averse to contesting novelty and nonobviousness because doing so may compromise other related litigation positions. Thus, the “directly contributes” standard is an
unworkable tool for resolving whether the use of the physiologically compatible solution directly contributes to the achievement of
the objective of the Marcos method.
If the first two parts of the proposed analysis are answered in
the affirmative, thereby permitting us to reach the third and final
part, the accused infringer would likely concede infringement under section 271(a) or 271(b) and obtain immunity under section
287(c).495 Relief, however, would only be available under section
287(c) if the accused infringer successfully defended herself
against any and all infringement suits that may arise under the
three exceptions.496

492.
493.
494.
495.
496.

Phycocyanin Patent, supra note 477.
Id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A).
§ 287(c).
Id.
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CONCLUSION
Section 287(c) fails to address many of the problems that
prompted its enactment. Chief among them are that medical procedure patents force doctors to engage in unnecessary litigation,
allow patent owners to abuse life-saving medical procedures, and
chill the open informational exchange that exists among physicians. Furthermore, section 287(c) is both discriminatory and unacceptably vague.
Medical procedure patents are problematic because they invite
doctors to litigate in courtrooms rather than perform surgery in operating rooms. Section 287(c) does nothing to solve that purported
problem. On the contrary, section 287(c) will probably provide
fertile ground for new litigation because the statute defines many
new definitions and tests, the scope of which have yet to be accurately defined.
Most of the definitions and tests are for the purpose of determining whether a particular medical performance is a “medical activity,” as defined by section 287(c)(2)(A). The first issue that
may arise is how “directly related” a performance on a nonhuman
body must be to a treatment of a human body to qualify as a medical activity.
After establishing that the performance is a medical activity, it
is necessary to see if the performance falls under any of the three
expressly stated exceptions. A patent owner seeking relief against
a medical practitioner should argue that one or more of the exceptions apply to attempt to prevent the accused infringer from escaping liability via section 287(c). Thus, in the first exception, “a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,” in the
second exception, “a patented use of a composition of matter,” and
in the third exception, “a biotechnology patent” are terms that will
be certain subjects of litigation, especially in light of the precedents proposed in the House Report.
For each exception, determining whether a practitioner may
avail himself of that exception depends on whether his performance is “in violation” of a claim in the same patent or other patents.
Because this question is just another way of inquiring whether the
defendant infringes other patented subject matter referred to by the
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exceptions, a completely separate infringement analysis would be
required for each of the relevant exceptions. The proponents of
section 287(c) could not possibly have intended this litigation
chain reaction.
Another problem purportedly addressed by section 287(c) is
that medical procedure patents allow patent owners to abuse lifesaving procedures by preventing or restricting their use. Section
287(c), however, is unnecessary to protect against such abuse because a court would likely deny an owner of a patented life-saving
medical procedure relief in the form of damages, injunctive relief,
or attorney’s fees.
Yet another purported problem of medical procedure patents
allegedly addressed by section 287(c) is that these patents hinder
the free informational exchange among health-care providers,
thereby causing a chilling effect between them. Under section
287(c), medical procedures are still patentable, just not enforceable. Therefore, any resulting chilling effect is not reduced because that process is left unchanged. Moreover, there is little support for the argument that patents have a chilling effect on
communication within any technological field. Under United
States patent law, an inventor may freely discuss with peers the invention immediately upon its discovery, and still obtain patent protection, as long as a patent application is filed within one year of its
disclosure. Section 287(c) does not change this. Thus, the statute
does not address, let alone solve, the purported problem of hindering the free informational exchange that many proponents of the
statute believe exists between physicians.
In addition to failing to address the problems that called for its
enactment, section 287(c) is discriminatory in at least two ways.
First, it provides a liability exception for “medical practitioners”
and “related health care entities,” but not for the general public.
Therefore, the general public would still be subject to relief
granted under sections 281, 283, 284, and 285. Second, the statute
discriminates with respect to a single field of invention, namely,
the field of medical procedures. That discrimination removes the
financial incentive to invent and to fully disclose inventions to the
medical community.
As a consequence of these failures, section 287(c) is destined
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to cause even more litigation and inequitable results. At minimum,
the section needs significant modification. The best solution, however, may be to repeal the section in its entirety.

